Macedonia:

A SWITZERLAND OF THE BALKANS

By Ivan Mihailoff

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(Translated from the original Bulgarian manuscript)
With an introduction by
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IVAN MIHAILOFF

"AND IF FOR A CROSS A GOLGOTHA IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY WE SHALL DESIGNATE IT; IT IS ALL OF EUROPE. AND IF A SUMMIT FOR A GOLGOTHA IS NEEDED, WE SHALL NAME IT MACEDONIA."

P. K. YAVOROFF[1]

1. Yavoroff was one of the greatest Bulgarian poets. During the Turkish regime, he departed to Macedonia as a volunteer *chetnik* and with rifle in hand fought for the liberation of his subjugated fellow-countrymen. He was an ardent supporter of the idea for an independent Macedonia, as well as for an independent Macedonian movement.

Introduction

There is no hope of peace in the world without peace in the Balkans, and it has long been evident that there will be no peace in the Balkans until there is a fair, just, and peaceful settlement of the Macedonian question. Quite aside from the claims of right and justice, it is evident that merely on a basis of cold self-interest the other nations of the modern world—even nations so distant as the Americans—are deeply concerned in a question which may at any time be the precipitating cause of a new war.

To the average American, concerned mainly with his own political problems, his family, and his business, Macedonia, if he hears about it at all, seems something very distant and of no concern to him.

If, however, he will read this book, he will learn better. He will come to understand why a rankling injustice half the world away may at any moment upset his peaceful American way of life and may even claim his own life or his son's. He will then see that an old American principle applies just as well in the Balkans as it does in the United States: "Nothing is ever settled until it is settled right."

The Macedonian question has never been settled—certainly it has never been settled right. This book will help Americans understand what the Macedonian question is and how it ought to be settled. I hope as many as possible will read it, for they will profit greatly by it.

JOHN BAKELESS

Translator's Preface

In the heart of the Balkan Peninsula lies the region known from ancient times as Macedonia. It is the same country that St. Paul saw in his vision:

"There stood a man of Macedonia and prayed Him saying, Come over into Macedonia and help us."

Yet it is the same country which now stretches hands across the seas and pleads for redeeming help.

The tragic history of the Balkan States, especially during the past sixty-five years, has been closely connected with Macedonia, often referred to as the "powder keg of the Balkans".

The Macedonian question is not of recent origin but has occupied the minds of European statesmen since 1878. Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin (July, 1878) provided for an autonomous status of Macedonia. The Turkish government then ignored the provisions of this Article and the Ottoman maladministration of Macedonia is a historic record. After the Macedonian Insurrection for freedom (August 2, 1903), the Emperor Francis Joseph and the Czar of Russia, Nicholas II, held a meeting at Murzsteg near Vienna (September 30, 1903), and as a result of their deliberations an Austro-Russian reform scheme was devised for the control of Macedonia. This scheme known as the "Murzsteg Program" ended with a complete *fiasco*. Conditions in Macedonia developed from bad to worse. As a consequence a meeting was held in Raval (June 10, 1908) by King Edward VII of England, Nicholas II of Russia, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Izvolsky, and the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Sir Harding. As a result of this meeting an agreement concerning an Anglo-Russian scheme of reforms was formulated. This would certainly have resulted in the

autonomy of Macedonia if its measures had been realized. The "Young Turks" revolution of July 4, 1908, thwarted the corrective efforts of the Great Powers.

The wars, especially the Balkan wars, have not solved any of the political Balkan controversial questions. The only apparent result of these struggles has been an economic exhaustion and an everlasting self-destructive hatred among the various Balkan peoples. It is obvious that should the Balkan States continue to follow the traditional policy of discord, their social, political, and economic development would be greatly retarded.

The outstanding cause for disagreement and eventual conflicts among the Balkan States is Macedonia—this geographic and economic unit of 25,000 sq. m. between Shar Mountain and the Aegean Sea, inhabited by nearly 3,000,000 people, with Salonica as its chief port.

For decades Serbia (now Yugoslavia), Greece, and Bulgaria have been quarreling and fighting for the conquest and annexation of Macedonia. Macedonia was and is the apple of contention between them. The most unfortunate thing so far has been that the Macedonian people have never been asked to decide on their political destiny.

Conquered and partitioned at Bucharest in 1913, the Paris Peace Treaties of 1919 did not change the fate of Macedonia. Judging from the Diary of the American representative, David Hunter Miller, the Committee on new States—which also drafted the so-called Minority Treaties—for the first time considered the Macedonian question on July 10, 1919. Italy stood for the autonomy of Macedonia, while England proposed that the League of Nations should appoint its own representative in Macedonia, to see that the rights of the people there were respected. But the Franco-Yugoslav opposition thwarted any solution of the Macedonian problem, and the Paris Peace Conference thus sanctioned the Bucharest Treaty of 1913, and Macedonia remained divided between Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria.

Since the conclusion of the Peace Treaties of 1919, the Macedonian problem became an open wound in the Balkans. This wound is still unhealed, simply because the proper treatment has not yet been administered. The treatment which will invariably cure this Balkan wound has been formulated by the great English statesman, William Gladstone, and expressed in four words: "Macedonia for the Macedonians!" This means the geographic unity of the three parts of Macedonia as an independent political unit, where all of its people can enjoy equal rights, obligations, and opportunities. Only under such conditions the Macedonian people shall be the masters of their own destiny. Macedonia will cease to serve as a medium of exchange in the transactions of the Balkan States. A united and independent Macedonian state shall play the role as a link of unity among the Balkan States. The proper solution of the Macedonian problem will lay the foundation for a Balkan federation or confederation which is so essential for the future economic and political stability of that region. This can readily be accomplished through the creation of an economic union of this area and political Good Neighbor relationship, all consonant with a world-wide spirit of the Good Neighbor. Peace will be lasting, especially in the Balkans, only when all the causes for disagreement and conflicts are neutralized.

Let us hope that the future peacemakers will profit from historical precedent and avoid the occurrence of tragic mistakes in the solution of the Balkan problem. In the cause of peace and justice for the Balkan peoples, (a) the Balkan lands should be for the Balkan peoples; (b) Macedonia must be for the Macedonians; (c) the plebiscite principle should be applied whenever necessary; and (d) no Balkan race should be subjugated to the domination of another.

Will the responsible factors for world peace ignore the application of these modest principles to the turbulent Balkan situation?

Ivan Mihailoff, the author of this book, is the outstanding ideologist and leader of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary

Organization, referred to as the *IMRO*. Organized as an underground revolutionary movement in 1893, the *IMRO* set its task to work for the liberation of Macedonia from Turkish rule. Greatly disappointed by the results of the Balkan war of "liberation" and by the Versailles settlement after the first World War, the *IMRO* renewed its struggle for Macedonian freedom and independence. Since 1924, Ivan Mihailoff has been the chief exponent of the aims and objectives of the *IMRO*.

Under several pen names, Mihailoff has written many works on Macedonia and the Balkan political situation in general. On this work, MACEDONIA: A SWITZERLAND OF THE BALKANS, his real name appears for the first time. Because of its authorship and subject matter, we feel this book to be very timely and of great importance to any student of Balkan history. There is hardly any news today from the Balkans which does not mention Macedonia and the current struggles. In this book, the author makes concrete and practical proposals for lasting Balkan peace and tranquility.

Christ Anastasoff

St. Louis, Mo.
April, 1950

Remarks

Thirty years ago, President Wilson's Fourteen Points for the settlement of the world were received with great cheers and elation. After the Divine Gospel of Christ, there was hardly a time when a message had awakened so much hope. It indicated that humanity's faith in the contemporary political system and its practice had been exceedingly shaken.

Since that time, the affairs of the world not only did not improve, but in many cases have become worse. Amidst the destructions of World War II and the resulting disappointment, world public opinion should, at least, have a more precise evaluation particularly of the imperfection of European politics and diplomacy. If nothing more, these destructions and sacrifices should lead to meditation upon, and a search for, a surer and more promising road for tomorrow. Can there be any doubt that we have come to this world chaos because of distrusts and political mistakes?

When peoples lose faith in a given political order, it may well be considered as bankrupt, and only through just deeds could their confidence be restored.

We are going to speak here about one of the big mistakes which was carried into effect in the Balkan Peninsula—the mistake with regard to Macedonia. This country is small, and its present political problem is one of the most renowned. Its name has been known since ancient times. Contemporary society has heard most about Macedonia in connection with her struggle for freedom.

Of the reality of this struggle, and the exact aspirations of the Macedonian people, the civilized world knows comparatively little. Many distorted facts and realities are known. Quite often

there is purposely omitted or incorrectly reported, that most important and enduring objective in the Macedonian movement—its peacemaking formula for the Balkan peoples.

The ideal for a free and independent Macedonia is noble. The justice for which the Macedonians are fighting is obvious. The struggle itself is idealistically managed and carried on. Objective foreign observers, familiar with the truth about Macedonia, are so numerous and authoritative, that every honest individual could readily comprehend this truth, and be able to evaluate the inimical scramble about Macedonia.

We are imbued with deep faith that a Balkan brotherhood shall be realized. For its attainment, the struggling Macedonian inhabitants have made terrible sacrifices. And today, more than ever before, they expect eagerly the triumph of the principles contained in the Atlantic Charter and announced by the Great Western Powers—principles which exactly coincide with the aspirations of the Macedonians. Macedonia, the oldest Balkan country, shall positively be resuscitated. Its population can no longer be left homeless in its own home. Its will to live and act through trials and tribulations not only continues, but, what is more, its efforts are being accelerated. All inhabitants of Macedonia, as well as her sons who have been driven away to foreign countries, believe that the day is near when human society will finally be placed upon a humane basis and that only in the animal kingdom will there be left examples of eating up the weaker by the stronger. Should there be no change for the better, the sad struggles between the peoples will continue. Such struggles shall become far more dangerous, particularly when in the near future the atomic revolver rather than the conventional one of today becomes a possession of the average citizen.

We hold that all unsolved and all wrongly solved questions should be presented openly for settlement. With regard to the Macedonian question the Balkan politicians can no longer bury their heads in the sand as the ostrich does. That is an old method

which some of them are still following. With scholasticism and ineffectual platitudes, no questions are solved, no peoples are contented, no unity can be achieved. Without action there will remain disunity, which is the ally of all ill-advised factors. The Balkan peoples must triumph over their disunity. That should be their first victory. And it can be attained only through justice and mutual respect.

The most essential condition for Balkan reconciliation and tranquillity lies, undoubtedly, in the unity, freedom, and independence of Macedonia.

THE AUTHOR

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Chapter I

The Case of Switzerland

THE BULK of politically minded people look upon Switzerland with admiration. Many people envy her happiness, her guarantee of the liberty of the individual, the harmonious development of her social relations, and the absence of friction in her foreign policy.

In reality there ought not to be anything miraculous in what the people of Switzerland have attained. What is more natural than the harmony of the nationalities which inhabit and live in that country? There is nothing more basic than the fact that all rights of her citizens are guaranteed; that the state offices and jobs are open to everyone and the people participate in the making of their laws; that national, religious, or class oppression does not exist; that the relations of Switzerland with the other countries are maintained calmly and harmoniously.

* * * * *

But it was not easy for her to achieve this objective. One need only turn over the pages of history in order to see the strain and struggles which the Swiss people have undergone for decades and centuries; through what domestic disputes and conflicts they have lived. How many disputes and conflicts occurred

among the western European states in connection with Switzerland!

The principal causes for the struggles and misfortunes in the past history of Switzerland were the scrambles of her neighbors, and the religious differences of her local population. The heterogeneous character of her inhabitants never was particularly a large source of domestic friction. Four nationalities—German, French, Italian, and Rhaeto-Roman[1] (akin to the north Italian mountain tribes)—lived in Switzerland. An ethnographic line decidedly separates the provinces. However, in many of the cantons both Catholics and Protestants live.

The religious divisions of the western world were once pronounced. Switzerland, too, had her grievous and prolonged religious struggles until she reached her present settled relations between church and state. But, prior to this settlement, in many instances the religious factions predominated in the struggle. Serious wars were waged on a purely religious basis.

In 1518 the Reformation began to make its way into Switzerland, chiefly through the efforts of Zwingli at Zürich. The effect of the Reformation for a long time was to divide Switzerland into separate camps. The internal struggles of the country were carried on with horrible severity. The cantons were divided into two hostile groups, with each group entering into alliance with foreign powers against one another. In many instances they threatened to secede from the union.

Thus, in 1531 there was a bar between the cantons with predominating Protestant population and those with a Catholic population. In 1656 there was another war in which the Bernese suffered defeat. Protestantism and Catholicism struggled for

1. In the last half-century, a reawakening of their national consciousness has led the Rhaeto-Romans to cultivate their language more extensively. Accordingly, the Swiss government recently added Rhaeto-Roman to the already existing list of official languages—German, French, and Italian.—Translator.

superiority. Internal dissensions, religious and political, continued for nearly two hundred years.

The last time the two great parties met in arms was at Villmergen in 1712, when Protestantism was the victor for this sector. The Bernese had achieved victory over their Catholic adversary and thus Protestant supremacy was achieved.

Serious agitations on questions of a purely political nature also formerly threatened the social order and the unity of the Swiss people. They experienced great friction and even open revolts. They often mobilized and alerted the army, and it was not until about a hundred years ago that Switzerland attained its ultimate internal settlement. Occasionally, the existing regimes resorted to violent measures and imposed themselves upon the majority of the population. In some cantons peasants' revolts flared up, as, for example, in 1653. In general, things were not going as smoothly in Switzerland as some would like to allege. In 1845 the last serious disturbances commenced. Because of political and religious disputes, seven cantons got together and began to organize military resistance against the other cantons, with the determination to secede from the Swiss commonwealth. An army of 100,000 men, led by General Guillaume Henri Dufour, quickly arrived from the other cantons, captured Lucerne, and defeated the seven cantons in 1847, which prevented their secession. It was then that changes were made in the structure of the country: from a confederation it now became a federation. In its organization Switzerland closely resembles the United States. In 1874 another step was made toward centralization through amendments to their Constitution. It is apparent, therefore, that more than once was the Swiss brotherhood afflicted by internal struggles. It has undergone many risks and difficulties.

But ultimately the spirit of fraternity and the consciousness of their common interests prevailed. These gave the Swiss people power in their stand against the pressures of their neighbors. In the aspiration toward their political resuscitation the Swiss

people paid with their blood. Above all, big wars were carried on by the Swiss people in their efforts to free themselves from the political domination of the Austrians. As a result of these struggles there was built the great legend about William Tell. Many defeats befell the Swiss people, but on several occasions they achieved brilliant victories, which have remained the pride of all Swiss generations.

Switzerland did not always succeed in fencing herself against foreign influences. Frequently she appeared to follow the will of some of the neighboring states. At times Switzerland waged wars against France, but later on in the sixteenth century, she swam in the political waters of France. Threatened by external dangers, even before the French Revolution, Switzerland had proclaimed armed neutrality. She also adopted such a policy in later situations. During the French Revolution, France had interfered in the affairs of Switzerland, as the Austrians had done previously—not an unusual occurrence in history. Foreign troops entered Switzerland. Reorganization of the state, patterned after the example of the French Revolution, was instituted. The cantons were reduced to ordinary administrative units, and a centralized state was created similar to that of France. Against this policy some of the cantons gave armed resistance. In the war which the European coalition initiated against revolutionary France, the Swiss people fought in both groups. During Napoleon's time there flared up an internal political struggle between the "unitarians", who advocated a centralized republic, and the "federalists", who stood for broad independence of the cantons. Napoleon, however, encouraged these disturbances so that he might act as arbiter in the internal affairs of Switzerland. About six thousand Swiss citizens perished as Napoleon's soldiers during his expedition against Russia. With the fall of Napoleon new forces arose in Switzerland with an aristocratic tendency in politics.

It was not until 1815 that the Great Powers recognized the neutrality of Switzerland and also the inviolability of her territory. But long before the domestic political struggles boiled

down, friction developed with a neighboring state. Thus, for instance, a war tension arose with France in 1838 because Switzerland refused to surrender Louis Napoleon.

The Austrian emperor Maximilian renounced his rights over Switzerland in 1499.[2] As an independent state Switzerland was for the first time recognized in 1648. This was nearly four hundred years after the beginning was made toward Swiss unity by the three forest cantons—Schwyz, Uri, and Unterwalden.[3] The number of Swiss cantons in 1789 was only thirteen. For a long time there were a number of other cantons—Saint-Gall and the town of Bienne—with seats and votes in the Diet without being in full federation. There were, besides, six allies of the confederation not enjoying these privileges—the Grisons, Valais, Geneva, Neuchatel, Muhlhausen, and the bishopric of Basel. Gradually, by eliminating the existing obstacles, they were all admitted into the Swiss commonwealth. Until several decades ago, many factors created barriers among the independent cantons. For example, tariff barriers existed between them and often their relations hung in the balance. The Swiss brotherhood of today, therefore, has been born of many risks and difficulties.

The five Great Powers,[4] by an act of acknowledgement and guarantee, dated at Paris, November 1815, declared that "the neutrality and inviolability of Switzerland, and her independence of all foreign influences, enter into the true interests of the policy of all of Europe." After the first World War, the states which recognized the existing condition of Switzerland's perpetual neutrality were twenty-five. Article 435 of the Versailles Treaty con-

2. The last war with Austria broke out in 1498. Victorious in this war, the Swiss were separated from the empire by the Peace of Basel in 1499.—Translator.

3. Nearly all cantons have alternative names in German and French. Thus, Obwalden and Nidwalden are known in French as Unterwalden-le-Haut and Unterwalden-le-Bas, respectively, which formed the nucleus with Uri and Schwyz in 1291 around which the other Swiss cantons were united.—Translator.

4. The Powers signatory to the Paris acknowledgment and guarantee of Switzerland's inviolability were the following: Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia.—Translator.

firms the Paris stipulations of 1815 and calls them "international engagements for the preservation of peace". On February 13, 1920, the Council of Ambassadors issued a declaration according to which Switzerland's neutrality was deemed justifiable to the interest of the general peace, and as part of the international law.

For decades now, no Swiss has ever considered the thought of secession, and no neighboring state has encroached upon Switzerland's independence. The general conviction is that the independent state of Switzerland guarantees a happy life for her inhabitants of four nationalities, reconciles her neighboring states, and thereby contributes her share for peace.

* * * * *

But let us for a moment imagine a different picture. Let us suppose that, in spite of the yearnings of the Swiss peoples, they had not attained their independence or that it was taken away from them. Let us further imagine that the Swiss lands are partitioned and placed under the rule of her three neighboring states; that France, for example, has taken the province included between Monlen, Basel, and the Zürich Lake; that Italy has taken over almost all the remaining provinces on the east up to the Austrian border, and that Germany has the territory around the Boden Lake with the cantons of Thurgau, Saint-Gall, and part of Zürich. Such a partition of Switzerland would give Italy about twenty thousand square kilometers of territory, France about seventeen thousand square kilometers, and Germany—even though the bulk of the Swiss people are of German stock—about five thousand square kilometers.[5] This would constitute a type of partition nearly identical with that into which Macedonia is partitioned by her three neighbors—Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria.

These hypothetical partitioners of Switzerland would surely resort to the same attempts at denationalization to which the Bul-

5. A square kilometer is the equivalent to .386 square miles. In terms of square miles then Italy would have 7,720 square miles, France, 5,762 square miles, while Germany, 1,930 square miles.—Translator.

garian population in Macedonia is at present subjected. With such a partition, of course, the public spirit of the Swiss people would not die, and their longing for liberation would remain. On the basis of an elementary foresight, then, the reigning conditions of the country would be the following:

An opposition frame of mind, quite hostile to foreign domination, would be found in every Swiss home. Agents of the foreign regimes, brought from afar, would be placed in every village and town. They would hold in their hands every key to the admistration, to the social and political life of the people, in order to administer things according to the requirements of the occupiers. One would no longer hear any mention of those Swiss prerogatives in the management of national affairs, that would be considered in a free country as its heritage. According to the policies of the different occupation authorities, there would be permitted, for example, the election of municipal councils in one county, but in another the councils would be appointed. In one locality the appointments would be made by the civil authorities, while in another, by the military commandants. In some places the elected officials would be of local people, but in other places they would be colonists from the dominating states. Efforts would be made in one community, through crafty politics that affect the livelihood of the people, to win over public "approval", while elsewhere the people would be driven with the butt-end of a gun. Examples of arbitrariness of the communal governments could be found in whichever district one wished to observe.

Moreover, interference in the political, economic, religious, educational, judiciary, or any other question that there might be, would be quite common. Of course, every vestige of cantonal independence would be erased. Without regard to traditions and local interests, the boundaries of the conquering three states would cut up many of the cantons. Above all, this would be exactly the aim and purpose of partitioning the country—to kill in the very beginning every Swiss thought for unity.

Every society that bore a Swiss label would be dissolved—even such innocuous ones as the charitable, sport, and vegetarian

organizations. Most forbidden of all would be any association that created ties between the Swiss people of different settlements and provinces. There would be organized new and different associations that would be led and managed either by colonist officials, or be sold to the authority of isolated Swiss individuals. These associations, of course, would serve as laboratories for anti-Swiss ideas. The schools, and, above all, the universities, would never bear Swiss names and would be denied academic national freedom. The majority of the professors, teachers, and the clergy would be brought from the conquering countries. Native instructors, and, in general, the intellectuals, would be tolerated as long as they would be willing to teach distorted facts of history, the falsification of Switzerland's past and her aspirations. The libraries would be purged of books that arouse the Swiss spirit. The monuments, which remind one of Swiss unity and independence, would be demolished. For that reason, the museums would be plundered. Punishment would befall everyone who would not surrender to the authorities any kind of article that might suggest the idea of Switzerland's political unity. For the monasteries of Switzerland, religious individuals would be brought primarily from the conquering states. Wherever possible, the alien authorities would make an attempt to change the personal names of the subjugated people, in order to give them resemblance to the names in the correlative three states.

The chief problem of the hypothetical conquerors would be to reduce the economic power of the Swiss people. The impoverishment of the people would be hastened through a series of measures. The bigger business enterprises would be taken away from Swiss control, and trade with the outside world would be under the exclusive control of the regime. The making of a living would be extremely difficult. The banks would be in the service of the alien regime. Most of the people's means would be diverted for purchases of the regime. The latter by all possible means would siphon Switzerland's money and wealth only to benefit itself and the country which it represented. Public and private construction would be greatly reduced. Whatever had

been built would gradually rot and disintegrate. In general, Switzerland would be only an object of exploitation, and in no way would she be a subject of justice. Switzerland's economy—if there could be one to speak of—would constitute only a small fraction of the bigger industries of the conquerors.

The political intrigues, framed and put forth from different centers, would ally with similar church intrigues, in order to arouse the old passions and disputes which had separated the Swiss people in the distant past. Under freedom such arguments could easily be liquidated, while under subjugation they would be more easily aroused.

The falsification of the most elementary truths would be common. At home and abroad there would be inflicted upon the world untruths with regard to the attitudes of the Swiss people toward the conquerors, in respect to results of election, should they be permitted, or concerning the economic conditions of the people, and so on. The basic tendency of such lies would be, of course, only against the idea of Swiss unity; though, occasionally, there might be said something in behalf of one or the other Swiss group, to serve as bait useful at moments for a given occupier.

One would hear some "Swiss" voices declaring that it would be better for the whole country to be incorporated in one of the neighboring states, either because she appeared more friendly, was rich, most democratic, or most powerful. Arguments would come up among the Swiss people themselves, in respect to the preference of the promises of the different occupiers for the total inclusion of Switzerland within their boundaries. Verbal and written proofs would be intermingled sometimes in favor of the enlightened and freedom-loving France, of others, in favor of the German racial kinness with the bulk of the Swiss people; or again, in favor of Italy because of the Roman contribution to the general European civilization. Here and there would occur conflicts among the Swiss people as they debated the question into which political grave it would be better to put the Swiss lands;

and, at the same time, there would be a huge number of Swiss people against every alien rule over their country.

Against all these evils, one would not be permitted to carry on even a legal fight. Swiss newspapers would not be permitted to write a single word against the attitude of the authorities or about the misfortune of the people. In general, it would be doubtful whether newspapers with political content would be permitted. Every resistance of the population would inevitably have to appear illegally. Secret organizations would have to be resorted to for the procurement of the most ordinary measures that would be deemed by the Swiss people as necessary and useful, either for the village, or the community, or the entire country. But such actions would be declared as moves against the state. As a consequence, the people would fall under the blows of the special state laws. Fines and imprisonment would be imposed, only because of the impetus to express the people's will. Without being noticed, though against their wish, the inhabitants would be forced to resort to the formation of secret armed associations for revolutionary actions. Therefore, their liberty-loving spirit would, conscientiously and with firm determination, move them to create revolutionary centres and organizations even during the early days of the subjugation.

Particularly after the sprouting of the struggle, the first step of the regime would be to limit the free movement of the people. Without special official documents it would be impossible for one to travel in any form of transportation conveyance. People would not even be permitted to go on foot from village to village or from city to city. What would be more disastrous is that such restrictions would bring about the greatest blow to the tourist trade which has brought to Switzerland its biggest revenue, and has made the country intimately known to millions of people throughout the world. One could imagine what degree of indignation and discouragement such measures would provoke among the Swiss people. Such state policy alone would be sufficient to bring about an armed resistance.

Correspondence would also become uncertain. Corresponding with foreign countries would be subjected to extreme restrictions. Eventually the introduction of martial law, and, of course, constant police sentinels would be arrived at. The prisons would be packed with convicted Swiss people, and the courts would constantly deal with trials of suspected citizens or of Swiss rebels. The state organization, with which the population would have constant dealings, would be the police force. For every revolutionary act, for any opposition to the most ordinary agent of the regime—however sunk in offences against the people he might be—mass trials and heavy fines would be imposed, and many hostages would be held. Because of the underground resistance movement—the constant roaming of "illegal" persons—there would be the common occurrence of encampment of police and military detachments on highways and roads. Strategic passes and bridges would be held by military or police detachments, and their billeting and feeding would be at the expense of the people in the nearby settlements. On account of this situation, encroachments upon the tranquillity, the property, and even the honor of the people would be of frequent occurrence. Physical terror would be felt everywhere, and, to be sure, many gallows would be erected.

Let us imagine further that, as a result of the existing conditions, there would be inevitably an attempt toward a huge Swiss political emigration to different countries. These emigrants would begin to enlighten the outside world by publishing newspapers, pamphlets, and issuing data concerning the state of conditions in their native land. They would present appeals and memoranda to foreign governments and to international organizations in a constant plea for help and justice. For the most part, of course, their appeals would remain without a response. But instead, there would be given to them plenty of advice for calmness and patience. They would frequently observe that their pleas for human rights, justice, and freedom would be considered by others as arousing trouble. The idealists from among these emigrants would be called adventurers and crazy, since their agitation would

tend to disturb the tranquillity of the Swiss people and be accused of endangering the peace of Europe.

There would appear Swiss emigrants' newspapers with a varying political tendency, and they would be published in different languages. Attempts would be made to issue newspapers for the Swiss people by the conquerors themselves in order to foster the latter's point of view and policy. It would be quite possible to arrive at a point where the public opinion abroad would have little concern about the Swiss people and their freedom, since it would be kept busy primarily with the order, peace, and tranquillity of the European continent.

There would be a complex intermixture of counsel, intrigues, impediments, or encouragements of different political-ideological currents from abroad—democratic, socialistic, communistic, and so on. And for good or ill, the Swiss people would invariably split on ideological bases. They would feel bitterly the ruinous effect of the division while under subjugation, even though it might be in the name of the purest and most innocent ideals.

Of course the Swiss youth would be mobilized into the armies of the three occupiers. If need be, they would be compelled to fight uselessly one against the other. There would be many cases of Swiss recruits deserting from these armies and finding refuge in other countries, or fleeing from the territory of one conqueror to that of the other. As a result of such cases, of course, alarm would be raised in connection with exchanged diplomatic notes for the extradition of refugees. Really, the ears of the world would be constantly deafened with Swiss affairs, disturbances, conflicts, and protests. There would be found in the cultural world many educated individuals who would recommend the transplanting of the Swiss people of certain restless provinces (or even from the entire country) to some remote continent, so that the western world might become once and for all quiet from disturbing Swiss events.

Meanwhile over the Swiss lands would be erected more and more strongholds for the strengthening of their bondage. In

many places there would be braided wire nets in order to frustrate the illegal escape of Swiss people. In the schools, children whose mother tongue is German would be taught in French or Italian. In places where the mother tongue is French they would be instructed in Italian, and conversely. Before the state authorities the Swiss people would have to make efforts to speak the language of the occupier.

The most persecuted and detested of all things would be the political name "Swiss". Under the circumstances, even William Tell would most certainly be declared a bandit.

Should an international institute or a humanitarian association attempt to raise its voice in behalf of the subjugated Swiss people, or—what would be more miraculous—to make an effort to investigate existing conditions over the Swiss lands, it would doubtlessly arrive at no results because of the reluctance of, and the impediments put forth by, the occupiers at the very beginning.

The dominating states which have partitioned the country among themselves would conscientiously flood the book markets with essays and dissertations. By these means they would try to prove the absolute necessity for holding under their jurisdiction the conquered lands, because of economic and strategic considerations or of racial affinity and historical backgrounds. Henceforth the cunningness of Berlin, Paris, and Rome would be endless.

One would see, therefore, that our imaginary Switzerland would have fallen into the same sort of situation in which Macedonia is now found, with a similar struggle for freedom and the same dark oppression.

Looking at it from the above-described unfortunate situation, the question of Switzerland's unity and freedom, and the attainment of her political independence, would seem to be quite difficult and complicated. For uninformed people it would

appear almost insolvable. The same thought would be entertained even by those individuals who lack a clear understanding of the mass of violences, intrigues, lusts, and falsifications, or who make no effort to study the sources and nature of the conqueror's confusing manipulations. They are thus unable to differentiate between the falsehood and the truth. If any one of these people would look—we shall repeat—upon this hypothetical subjugation of Switzerland, as pictured above, he would shrug his shoulders in hopeless indication that it would be impossible for that land to be independent, organized, and free; that she, in general, is not in condition to live as free and independent even though such freedom and independence were given to her. Had such people seen one hundred fifty years ago the difficulties with which the Swiss people had to deal, they would then have shrugged their shoulders and would have said that only by a miracle could Switzerland acquire existence as an independent state.

Behold the day! The "miracle" is before us. Switzerland figures now as a free and independent country—the best organized and most peaceful European State. This indicates that the Swiss question was in reality quite easy to settle. It was made complicated only by alien obstruction and the absence of good will. It becomes very simple when there is good will and the recognition of certain fundamental principles. It is these which eventually brought about the creation of a free state of Switzerland.

In the case of Switzerland the following situations are characteristic:

1. Switzerland occupies a central position among her three neighbors—Germany, France, and Italy.

2. Its population is made up of parts of her neighboring nations.

3. Numerically, of the different nationalities comprising Switzerland's population, the German element predominates.

4. It was manifested how harmful the disrupted state of conditions in Switzerland was, not only for her inhabitants but also for her neighbors. For a long time Switzerland was "an apple of discord" which caused great conflict and bloodshed.

5. Switzerland's population itself had given the first signal about the necessity for her unity.

6. From a local question the Swiss problem gradually developed into a European problem, vitally connected with the general peace.

7. A considerable number of diplomatic actions and enough protractions occurred before a salutary decision for the recognition of an independent state was reached.

8. Suffering caused by domestic friction and strife, as well as her struggles with neighboring states (including the fights among the neighbors themselves) not only were not reduced but were greatly augmented.

9. An inspiring legend was built about Switzerland's struggles for freedom.

10. Two basic pillars sustain the uniqueness of Switzerland since she became a free and independent state: first, the existing guarantee of free national development of her different nationalities, and, second, the full respect of civil and political equality for all.

11. By the creation and the guarantee of an independent Swiss state, Europe has earned the following blessings: (a) it dried up a dangerous spring of strifes between the three neighboring nations, which thereby contributed toward the general peace; (b) it now furnishes a glittering example for a prudent settlement of questions similar to that of Switzerland; (c) it rendered a gratifying justice with regard to the inhabitants of Switzerland.

In the spirit of these characteristics, no other country in Europe resembles Switzerland so much as does Macedonia. Every

Macedonian would answer you that the question for the settlement of Macedonia is very simple, but it is made complicated only by the self-aggrandizement of her neighbors and the considerations of distant states. When the Macedonian fighters put forth a brief explanation of the aims and objectives of their aspirations for a unified and independent Macedonia, they would fundamentally state that they fight for a "Switzerland" in the Balkans. In the following pages is explained in more detail why the Macedonian liberation movement has put this as its political aim.

Chapter II

Macedonia: Geographic Importance, Economic Possibilities, National Origins of the Population

MACEDONIA is a geographic center of the Balkans. Around her are situated Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania.

The Vardar River cuts Macedonia from north to south into two equal parts. Whichever country controls the valley of this river—from the sources to its delta at Salonica—might well be said to hold the most important part of the Balkan Peninsula.

The southern boundary of Macedonia is the Aegean Sea and the Bistritsa River. The western boundary passes by the Ochrida Lake and through the summits of the Albanian border mountains, Korab and Pindus. On the north Macedonia is bordered by the Shar, Osogov, and Rila mountains. The eastern border is formed by the Rhodope mountains and the Mesta River (Kara-Su).

A glance at the map would show us why the most vital Balkan questions are so involved with Macedonia.

From ancient times, highways stretching to the Danube, Constantinople, the Aegean and Adriatic Seas passed through

Macedonia. These routes were of great importance not only to the surrounding neighbors but even to distant countries.

The nearest tie of the whole Balkan Peninsula with the countries around the eastern Mediterranean Sea is through Macedonia and her large seaport of Salonica.

In recent times, the two roads that pass through the valleys of the Macedonian rivers, Vardar and Struma, and terminate at Salonica and Kavala, are becoming of much greater value to the countries of eastern and central Europe. The importance of these roads to Rumania, Poland, western Ukrane, Bulgaria, and Serbia is as great as the importance of the Saint Gotthard Pass is to the German lands and Italy, or as the port of Trieste is to Austria, Hungary, Slovene, Czechoslovakia, and Croatia. Salonica and Kavala would render their real value to many nations, and play their most important commercial-economic role, naturally, only when the hinterland—Macedonia—from which they are an inseparable part would become a peaceful land over which progress, liberty, and justice would reign. The Saint Gotthard line serves a tremendous commercial exchange between Germany and Italy only because of the security of the political situation of Switzerland. After 1913, Salonica and Kavala were cut off from the hinterland and subjected to the stresses of a pincer-like position.

With her excellent seaports, the importance of Macedonia would grow much greater, particularly after the often suggested plan for the development of the Morava and Vardar as navigable rivers is accomplished, and when the needed bridges over the Danube River are built. Then the exchange of commodities between central and eastern Europe with the Balkans and the Near East countries would be greatly facilitated, and for the bigger part of the European continent the shortest commercial routes toward the Suez canal would be assured.

It is obvious that Macedonia appears as a first-class commercial base between the bigger part of Europe, northeastern Africa, and the Near East. Salonica, the most valuable seaport

of southeastern Europe, could reach and even surpass those great commercial seaports in the western Mediterranean Sea—Geona and Marseilles.

The most maritime country of the Balkans is Greece. From the standpoint of international commerce, the sea has for Greece only a limited importance. As fishermen, seamen, and local merchants a great number of Greeks derive their livelihood from the sea. Inverse is the case with Macedonia. The latter's seacoast is of extraordinary importance to millions of people of other nations as shown above.

And, from a strategic standpoint, especially with the new development of sea warfare, the importance of Macedonia's seacoast is as great as that of Greece. The nearness of Macedonia to the Dardanelles and the Suez canal makes her coast line and harbors strategically important. A fleet of submarines starting from Macedonian waters would easily blockade Constantinople from the south and also endanger the entrance to the Suez canal. For penetration toward the Danube from the Mediterranean Sea, Macedonia has greater military importance since her coast lines are farther north than those of Greece. The first World War with the well-known Salonica front was ultimate proof of this.

Is it not now easy for one to see why the aspirations of the four Balkan states—Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Albania—meet in Macedonia? There, for a long time, English and Russian ambitions have been conflicting. Familiar, also, are the rivalries of the other great powers in that direction—the former Austria-Hungary, Italy, and, to a certain extent, Germany. In connection with Macedonia, the world is now witnessing an open conflict of policies between Russia, on the one hand, and the Anglo-Saxon powers on the other.

Macedonia as a crossroad of communications, as a land of tremendous commercial possibilities, and as a strategic area obvi-

ously plays in the Balkans a more significant role than Switzerland does in western Europe. That is, Macedonia appears as a more important "apple of discord". The disputes and conflicts about questions connected with Macedonia bear resemblance to those which formerly existed in connection with Switzerland. For the best and the most just settlement of the Macedonian question, therefore, it would be necessary to resort to the same measures which western Europe applied to Switzerland—the creation of an independent Macedonian state, patterned after the example of Switzerland.

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In the above-indicated boundaries, Macedonia does not differ much in extent from the state of Philip II, the father of Alexander the Great. The local native population itself, and the neighboring peoples call this province by the name of Macedonia. They know exactly what districts are traditionally considered to fall within her geographic boundaries. This is also confirmed by many foreign scholars.[6]

For centuries the economic direction of Macedonia has been toward the south, the Aegean Sea, into which all Macedonian rivers flow, and toward that direction is the attention of her inhabitants focused. Now, unfortunately, she is compelled economic-

6. About Macedonia, as well as on the question of her emancipation, much has been written. Considerable literature has been created in the Bulgarian, French, German, English, Italian, and other languages. In all big nations there could be found scholars with excellent knowledge of the geographic situation of the country, the economic conditions, the people's way of life, as well as the ethnographic truth. In the Russian language data may be found in the works of Prof. Paul N. Miliyukoff, Prof. N. S. Derjavin, Prof. Selisheff, Prof. T. Florinski, and Kondakoff. In the French are the works of Col. Leon Lamouch, Ami Bué, Prof. Louis Leger, Prof. E. de Laveleye, George Desbon, and F. Poukevil. In German, we find the works of Prof. Schultz-Iena, Prof. Gustav Weigand, and Prof. Carl Shrupp. In English, H. N. Brailsford and G. M. Mackenzie write on these subjects. In the Czech and other languages valuable information is found in the works of the great Czech scholars, P. E. Shaferick, L. Hinderle, and L. Kouba; the works of the well-known Croatian Slavist Prof. Vatroslav Yagich; in Bulgarian, the works of Prof. Yordan Ivanoff and Vasil Kunchoff. This comprises only a small fraction of the large number of authors who have written about Macedonia.

ally to direct herself to the north, particularly toward Serbia, and to receive her imports from Europe and export her products there through the Danube River. The boundaries which were arbitrarily drawn through her body in 1913, and were confirmed anew in 1918, are, from an economic standpoint, an enormous misfortune to the population of Macedonia. Among many other evils they have greatly contributed to the decline of the seaport of Salonica.

The industrial life of Macedonia is almost identical with that of her neighboring Balkan states. Of course, in certain respects some of these countries, during the past fifty years, have made important progress and surpassed Macedonia by their industrial undertakings. Their advancement was largely due to the fact that they enjoy a free life, while Macedonia groans under political and economic subjugation. However, some other neighbors, Albania for example, in her industrial development and her whole material culture, have remained far behind Macedonia.

In their enterprising spirit, and in general their ability according to the testimony of many foreign observers, the Macedonian population surpasses that of the neighboring peoples. As workers, the Macedonian people are energetic, honest, and considerate. The peasants are frugal and industrious. Under conditions of freedom great achievements could be effected by the alert and endowed-with-initiative inhabitants of Macedonia. Unfortunately, the absence of freedom hinders their progress, and their country remains undeveloped, without sufficient roads, without good and hygienic homes, and without adequate tools and machines.

As far as the communications are concerned, they are not entirely bad since no district of Macedonia is isolated because of lack of roads. All the cities are connected with highways between them, which for the Balkans may be considered as very good. If only two or three thousand more miles of roads could be constructed the country would be more than satisfied. As for

the railroads, it would be necessary that there be constructed at least four or five more lines, so that the country could be crossed from one end to the other. All of this, of course, could be easily achieved, provided there were no interference of political circumstances and that the heretofore existing uncertain atmosphere were eliminated. Even now the omnibus communications render good service there, in spite of the fact that they are greatly hindered by the artificial boundaries which divide the country. Doubtlessly an independent state of Macedonia would have its own merchant fleet that would facilitate the commercial connections of the Balkans with those of the rest of the world.

For a cursory comparison with Switzerland, however, it should be noted that the construction of highways and railroads in Macedonia would be much easier and less costly than similar constructions in Switzerland. In Macedonia it would be unnecessary to build so many bridges, curves, and tunnels running amidst rocks, as there are in Switzerland.

Undoubtedly, Macedonia has some of the richest undeveloped mineral resources in the Balkans. Heretofore her subsoil wealth has remained almost entirely uncovered. Under a solid guarantee of peaceful creative industry, and by attracting foreign investment capital on a guaranteed basis, huge wealth could be extracted from the bosom of the Macedonian soil, which would help fundamental material reorganization, would create industry, and promote better living conditions for the people.

Among the various ores for mining, there are copper, lead, chrome, zinc, magnesium, nickel, and iron. Gold and silver in small quantities have already been discovered. There are prospects for the future attainment of bigger quantities of coal. There are places also where good marble could be dug up.

The extent of the water power wealth is considerable. Its development would greatly help to hasten the industrialization of

tains, lakes, the Mediterranean coast, or to Salonica and Aton.

Elsewhere above we mentioned that under a political freedom of Macedonia there would develop a large commercial activity by both land and sea. She could export in large quantities to other countries the following products: wheat, hides, wool, cheese, butter, meat, fruits, vegetables, cotton, silk or silkworms, opium, tobacco, and rice. Even while she was under the Turkish regime she exported many of these products. Commercial ties were had for a long time with countries across the seas, and with Vienna, Leipzig, Venice, Ragusa, Constantinople, Smyrna, and other places. But the former Macedonian commerce would turn pale before that which a free and independent Macedonian state could develop.

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Let us here make a comparison with Switzerland.

It is impossible to compare the industry, which in Switzerland has reached a high degree of development, while in Macedonia is still in its infancy. However, it should be pointed out that Macedonia will never have any need for such large and heavy industry, since the Macedonian people derive their livelihood not as industrial workers but mainly as tillers of the land. For the most part they are peasants. Apart from her industrial advantages, Switzerland in many respects is poorer than Macedonia. Her climate is more severe, while that of Macedonia is very mild. Switzerland is a land inclosed by mountains, while Macedonia is washed by the Mediterranean Sea. Switzerland must depend almost entirely upon imports from foreign countries for needed coal for her industries, while Macedonia in no respect is so economically dependent on foreign countries. What Switzerland earns serving as a trade route for the neighboring states, Macedonia could make to a much greater extent through her land, river, and sea routes.

The cultivation of the land heretofore has been carried on by very primitive methods. Until recently most of the people there did not know what a modern plough was. They tilled the soil with an old primitive type plough which had been in use for a thousand years. If intelligently cultivated, the Macedonian farm land could feed six or seven million people, instead of the present population of less than three million people.

Excellent conditions exist there for better development of cattle-raising. At present, sheep-breeding is the most developed. But even that could be increased and modernized, so that more cheese and butter could be exported. And there should have been reached long ago a considerable export of preserved meat.

In the various Macedonian lakes even now there is an abundance of fish, and more, of course, in the coastal waters of the Aegean Sea. There could be attained a well-developed fishing industry.

There are numerous locations of mineral springs around which could be erected curative and recreational centers for the local population as well as for foreign guests.

After Dalmatia, Macedonia is the country in the Balkans which could offer to the tourists outstanding and genuine mountainous beauty. The Pirin, Rila, Shar, Koral, Belasitsa, and other mountains are full of nature's charm, but for the present they are still in lack of good roads and tourists' accommodations. At the eastern boundary of Macedonia, in the Despough forests, there are topographic conditions suitable for the creation of artificial lakes. (Several enterprising foreign companies were once interested in such projects.) Automobile highways could be constructed along the entire coast line of the country. Macedonia has some of the most beautiful lakes in the Balkans. Two of them are nearly as large as Lake Geneva. Once a free country, Macedonia could attract many lovers of nature to her beautiful moun-

the country. Of course, Macedonia does not entertain the dream of attaining heavy industries, but she would primarily seek to improve and augment those which are directly connected with the productivity of her land; for example, the tobacco industry, cotton, wool, opium, some of the oil producing or industrial crops, and so on. There could also be developed without much effort a small textile industry which has been in existence since the Turkish regime. The raw materials which are found in the country itself could be used in the establishment of other industrial branches. The electrification of the country could be achieved without any particular difficulty.

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The climate and soil of Macedonia are very favorable. Authorities have shown us that no other land in the whole southern part of Europe, starting from France and as far east as the Caucasus, ever produces so many different products as that of Macedonia. The soil yields a good quality of grains; various industrial crops; world-famous tobacco which is the best in the Balkans; opium, anise, sesame, and cotton. Large quantities of fruits, potatoes, corn, and rice are already being grown in Macedonia. There is also silkworm cultivation.

In some sectors of Macedonia crops are harvested twice during the year. Under scientific cultivation and conservation of the arable soil its production would at least be doubled, particularly if irrigation and the use of artificial fertilizers would be resorted to. The introduction of modern methods would improve the tobacco, rice, and cotton production, since there is a great possibility of increasing their quantity. There is also a great future for the fruit trade.

Tracts of undeveloped land exist in Macedonia which should also be developed under a basic agricultural scientific plan. More forests could be created from those which the country now has.

For the present sheep-breeding in Switzerland is better, but in Macedonia all the necessary conditions are present to reach Switzerland's level, and even surpass it. Switzerland has more forests, but through a reforestation program Macedonia could eventually attain comparable production. Not only has Switzerland less territory, but it is also less productive. The extent of the arable and cultivated land in Macedonia is much greater and yields, comparatively, more foodstuffs and other products. Switzerland, like Belgium and Austria, has less agricultural possibilities for self-sufficiency. They produce less foodstuffs, yet they have to feed a greater population. They have a large urban population, while in Macedonia the rural population is greater and, what is more, a big part of it is engaged in the cultivation of the soil and produces, at least, its own subsistence. While Switzerland is exporting and will, no doubt, export more industrial products, such as machines, Macedonia would export more and more products from her land. The time will come when she could also export industrial products, for in mineral wealth Macedonia is richer than Switzerland. Macedonia is more nearly a geographic whole and capable of becoming an economic whole better than Switzerland.

This cursory comparison shows how shallow are the allegations of those interested countries which wish to create the impression that Macedonia, if it were an independent state, could not economically exist or be self-sustaining. Such assertions might be true about some other European countries, but not about Macedonia. If an imprisoned Serbia, if a barren and rocky Greece could sustain themselves and exist as independent states, it certainly seems that Macedonia as an independent state could economically sustain herself much better. She could even render considerable help to her above-mentioned neighbors.

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Macedonia has 25,376 square miles of territory. With such a large area she is larger than the following European countries:

Belgium—11,755 square miles; Switzerland—15,940 square miles; Esthonia—18,362 square miles; Latvia—20,463 square miles; Albania—10,630 square miles; Slovakia—18,895 square miles; Luxemburg—999 square miles.[7]

Until 1912, which was the time she enlarged herself at the expense of Macedonia, Serbia was smaller than Macedonia. Prior to 1912, Serbia's territory was 18,784 square miles; Greece's territory was 24,969 square miles—nearly as large as that of Macedonia. Montenegro as an independent state had only 3,733 square miles. Recently there has been created two Palestine states—an Arabic and a Jewish—of which the total area is only 10,000 square miles.

Some of the above-enumerated states have a larger and others a smaller population than that of Macedonia. In quantity of production as well as in population, Macedonia is nearly identical with Ireland. During 1912 the population of Macedonia numbered nearly 2,500,000 people.

The economic resources in most of the above-mentioned countries are far less than those of Macedonia. None has or enjoys such a valuable geographic situation as Macedonia. All of them now are separate and independent states, although it has been said for all of them that they could not possibly be independent. Until recently it was generally argued that even Ireland could not sustain itself as a separate state. For centuries

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7. Macedonia is larger in population than any one of the following South, Central, and North American states: Paraguay, Uruguay, Panama, Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Delaware, Connecticut, Maryland, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, Maine, Florida, Oregon, Kansas, West Virginia, Nevada, Nebraska, Colorado, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Washington, Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Arizona.

Macedonia is also larger in territory than the following Central and North American states: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Delaware, New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and West Virginia.—Translator.

Montenegro survived as an independent state even though her territory is one-seventh and her population one-eighth that of Macedonia, and, for the most part, Montenegro's land consists of discouragingly barren rocks. In population and territory Albania is far smaller and much poorer than Macedonia. It is quite obvious, therefore, that by both the size of her territory and population, Macedonia possesses and enjoys excellent conditions for an independent state life.

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For many centuries, the following five national or ethnic groups, Greeks, Bulgarians, Turks, Albanians, and Arumanians (Kutso-Vlachs), lived in Macedonia. Later on Jewish settlements developed. We now find that every trace of the ancient Macedonians, fellow countrymen of Alexander the Great who inhabited the country two or three thousand years ago, is erased.

The Greeks were primarily found in the coastal cities. The Greek settlements by the seacoast are very old, dating as far back as ancient Greece and the Byzantine epoch. After 1922 many were brought in from Asia Minor and have settled a little northward from the seacoast.

The Albanians are also ancient inhabitants of the Balkans. Taking advantage of their privileged position as Mohammedans during the Turkish domination of the country, Albanian settlements were established in some of the western districts of Macedonia.

In the fifth century after Christ, the Bulgarian Slavs settled

compactly in Macedonia. They were in the minority only in some of the coastal towns.

The Arumanians are also ancient inhabitants of the Peninsula. They came into Macedonia from the south, because of pursuit by the Mussulmans. It is generally believed that some of them have been living in Macedonia since the time of the Roman conquest. Their settlements are primarily found to the west of the Vardar River.

The Turks arrived in Macedonia as conquerors in the fifteenth century. They have settled in every strategic province, village, and town of the country.

The Jews are mainly concentrated in Salonica and a small number of them are found in some of the other cities.

By occupation the Greeks were primarily merchants and tradesmen; the Albanians and Arumanians were primarily sheep-breeders; the Bulgarians and the Turks were primarily farmers. But this demarcation is not necessarily absolute. Many of the artisans and merchants were also Bulgarians, Turks, Arumanians, and Albanians. In some localities the Greeks were also engaged in agriculture. The Jews were mainly merchants, while the Turks were public functionaries and soldiers.

It was only in the last few years of the Turkish domination that the masses of the peasants began to become owners of the land which they had worked for centuries. During the Turkish regime the bulk of the land was owned by the so-called *beys*, large feudal landowners. But thanks to the measures taken by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (*IMRO*) against the feudal Turks, they were compelled to sell their land possessions to the Macedonian peasants.

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Numerous authorities[8] on Macedonia are compelled to use the statistics which were issued before 1912. The reason for this is, first, because after that date there were no reliable new statistics, and, second, ever since 1912 there began a forceful exchange and expulsion of the population from some Macedonian districts.

The round number of the nationalities living in Macedonia until 1912 is the following:

Bulgarians	1,200,000
Greeks	240,000
Turks	500,000
Albanians	160,000
Arumanians	80,000
Jews	90,000
Miscellaneous	40,000

According to Leon Dominian's statistics published by the American Geographic Society of New York, the Greeks of Macedonia number 190,000.

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8. Dr. Carl Shrup, Professor of Civil Law at the University of Frankfort-on-Main, and member of the Institute for International Law, in his book, *The Just Situation of the Macedonians in Yugoslavia,* gives nearly twenty statistical sources on the composition of the population of Macedonia.

That the Bulgarians of Macedonia number about 1,200,000 people is further established by the following authorities on Macedonia referred to in Prof. Shrup's book: V. Teploff, Russian, whose data were published in 1877; Stephan Verkovich, a Croatian scholar whose works were published by the Serbian Academy of Science and contain data published in 1889; Prof. Gustav Weigand, an excellent scholar of the Macedonian Bulgarians and Arumanians, whose works with information on Macedonia were published in 1898; Gaston Rutier, Frenchman, whose data were published in 1903 in his book, *La Macedoine et le Puisance;* Prof. T. D. Florinski, Russian, whose data were published in 1907 in his book, *The Slav Populations: Statistical-Ethnographic Review of the Slavic Population of Our Day;* Robert Pelletier, Frenchman, whose data were published in 1913 in his book, *The Truth of Bulgaria;* Richard von Mach, whose data were published in 1906 in his book, *Der Machtbereich der Bugarischen Exarchat in der Turkei;* Leon Dominian, an American, whose data were published in 1917 by the American Geographical Society of New York, in his book, *The Frontiers of Language and Nationality of Europe.*

According to the information of the Croation scholar, Stephen Verkovich, for many years student of the country, the authoritative Prof. G. Weigand, and the distinguished Bulgarian geographer, Vasil Kuncheff, the Bulgarian population of Macedonia constitutes 52% of the total, while according to many other scholars, well informed with the Macedonian question, it is estimated at 50% of the total population.[9] After the conquest of the country by the Turks, a considerable number of Bulgarians were converted to Mohammedanism. These Mohammedan Bulgarians, known as "pomaks", do not figure in the above-shown figure for the Bulgarian population.

In almost every authoritative and serious encyclopedia the above per centum, with no difference, is shown.

In reference to Macedonia, the most inaccurate are the Greek and Serbian official statistics. They are refuted even by the Turkish statistics.

The heterogeneous ethnic groups of the population of Macedonia are segments of the nationalities which for centuries inhabited the Balkans and have their own national states. In this respect the situation is almost the same as that of Switzerland. In the ethnographic sense, there does not exist a separate "Macedonian nation" as there is no separate ethnic Swiss nation. The nationalities and ethnic groups of Macedonia use the literature and language which is common for the whole correlative nation—Turkish, Albanian, Greek, Bulgarian, Rumanian—as in Switzerland the nationalities there speak and write German, French, and Italian languages.

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9. The Turkish statistics have always shown the Macedonian Bulgarians as 50% of the total population of Macedonia.

In Switzerland the entire population is Christian, but divided into Catholics and Protestants. In Macedonia there are Mussulmans and Christians. Almost all of the Christians are of the Eastern Orthodox faith. Such disputes as there were among the peoples were chiefly due to the difference of nationalities rather than of religious differences.

Shortly before the Balkan War, the Turks attempted to colonize Macedonia with Bosnians, who left Bosnia after the ultimate annexation of the country by Austria-Hungary. But this colonization was not successful. After Turkey's defeat in 1912, practically all the Bosnian settlers fled to Turkey proper. After the first World War, Serbia had also attempted to settle in Macedonia her nationals from the districts which she had acquired from Hungary. This attempt also culminated into a *fiasco.* Greece, after she was defeated in the war against Turkey in 1922, brought several hundred thousands of her fellow-Greeks from Asia Minor. These people were settled in the localities vacated by the Turkish inhabitants, in accordance with the treaty for the exchange of populations, and also in places vacated by thousands of Bulgarians expelled by the Greek authorities.

On the basis of this increase of the number of Greeks in that sector of Macedonia which is under Greek jurisdiction, interested factors endeavor to put forth the idea that an independent Macedonia would be entirely impossible. Such an assertion is, of course, unfounded. Those who point this out never did wish an independent Macedonia even while the Greeks there were less in number. If there are so many reasons that make the creation of an independent Macedonian state imperative, the large number of Greeks there in no way should thwart such a solution. The Bulgarians were five times greater in number than the Greeks

of Macedonia, and yet they did not take advantage of this circumstance to argue against the political unity of the country. One would observe that in Switzerland the German-speaking population numbers about 71%, while the French-speaking is about 21%, and the Italian-speaking is about 6% of her total inhabitants. Never did the German-speaking Swiss inhabitants say that Switzerland must not exist and that they ought to join Germany since they are in the majority. The numerical relationship among the nationalities of Macedonia in no way minimizes the benefits to be achieved by the solution of the Macedonian question through the creation of an independent state.

One hears objections to the effect that the main obstacle for the realization of an independent Macedonian state, especially if it ought to be organized on a federal basis, is the fact that there is a mixed population, and that in every province there are inhabitants of two or more nationalities. But even that cannot be entirely the basis for the rejection of the idea for the independence of the country. After all, there is not a single province there in which the population of a certain nationality does not predominate. That would facilitate in resorting to the use of the cantonal system in the organization of the country. But the full equality of the five local languages would once and for all time adjust the relationship among the different nationalities. In general, the southern part of the country has now a predominating Greek character, while the whole central and northern part of the country is predominantly Bulgarian. In a few of the most western districts the Mussulmans—Albanians and Turks—might prove to be in the majority. In this manner the contour of the probable cantons could be sketched, if they must absolutely have a national color. But Macedonia could organize herself excellently without resorting to the cantonal system, for which heretofore

she has had no tradition. Equality and freedom for every citizen and every nationality would be sufficient basis.

Chapter III

Aspirations of the Balkan States

AFTER THE division of the Roman Empire during the latter part of the fourth century, the eastern half, known by the name of Byzantium, included almost the entire Balkan Peninsula. Although the Greek nationality gradually gained preponderance in Byzantium, it was never Greece.

For nearly four centuries the Balkan lands remained under Byzantine domination. It was during that time that the Balkans were flooded by a large number of trans-Danube Slavic tribes. Toward the end of the seventh century the Bulgarians crossed the Danube and, after much bloodshed and many struggles, settled in the northeastern corner of the Balkan Peninsula. They thereby came into permanent contact with Byzantium, which was a state comprised by various nationalities and which extended beyond the European continent. Its official language was Greek, but its people called themselves Romans and not Greeks, because the Greek element was numerically unimportant. In the seventh century Bulgaria emerged and shortly afterward she appeared as Byzantium's rival for Balkan supremacy. For centuries Macedonia was held by the Bulgarians, while at times the Bulgarian army had reached as far as the vicinity of Athens.

The Serbians appeared much later on the historical scene. However, as they reached the western borders of Bulgaria, the Serbs came into conflict with Bulgaria, and when the latter had weakened, the Serbians clashed for a short time with Byzantium. In the fourteenth century the Serbian state extended over Macedonia, but only for very short periods, at times for ten years, at others for twenty, and at the eve of the Turkish ascendancy, for thirty years.

The Turks were rulers of Macedonia for five full centuries —from the end of the fourteenth century until 1912.

In their mutual conflicts the Balkan states allude to those historical proofs which conform with their self-interests to justify their aspirations toward Macedonia. But, from the standpoint of contemporary life and necessity, these "proofs" are very meager and lifeless. Today, there are far more comprehensive, crying necessities that have incomparably greater weight on the scale, when all considerations are being weighed for one or the other decision with regard to Macedonia. But since the Serbians make such an effort to stress historical references in order to justify their aspiration over Macedonia, it is essential that we should not entirely by-pass this question. As far as the Serbians are concerned, the truth itself is contained in the following well-established proof: the Serbians have by far the weakest historical claim for their pretension over Macedonia. By the force of such basis of claim, even the Turks would have full right to demand the incorporation of Macedonia within their borders, since they dominated Macedonia for five centuries; that is, about fifteen times longer than the Serbians who held only some of the provinces. The Turks not only dominated the whole country, but, what is more, there were 500,000 Turkish inhabitants, besides about 150,000 Mussulman Albanians, and about 100,000 Bulgarians who had been converted to Mohammedanism. Notwithstanding the fact that the bulk of the Turkish population has emigrated to Turkey proper, a considerable number of Turks are still living in some Macedonian districts, but there have never been any Serbians in Macedonia.

From a national and also a historical standpoint, Serbia has no right to pretend for Macedonia. In this respect the rights of Bulgaria and Greece are obvious and large. Before them stands helpless every chauvinistic sentimentalism, such as that of the Belgrade propaganda center which has contributed so much to the artificial complications of the Balkan situation. Through the force of circumstances and a lucky chance, once she set her foot in Macedonia, the Serbian intelligentsia began to imagine that it would be able to manage the entire affairs of the wide space from the Alps to the Black Sea. Toward this aim she is persisting with her political madness, which constantly disturbs the Balkan people. Serbia raised her own delusions into sacred maxims, while her propaganda even today aims and strives to erase completely all ethnic and historic facts which alone are the sacred truths. Serbia's pretensions over Macedonia have primarily a motive of conquest.

But, say the Serbian advocates, Serbia has waged three wars for Macedonia since 1912. For the conquest of foreign lands a country may wage thirty wars. In reality, since 1912, three or four wars have been waged by Greece and by Bulgaria for Macedonia. These countries, at least, have the solace to their conscience that they were engaged in these wars for the liberation of their subjugated brothers—the Greeks for their fellow-nationals along the Macedonian seacoast and the Bulgarians for their own brothers, living throughout the length and breadth of Macedonia. The Serbians have had none of their own people to liberate in Macedonia.

In recent times the Serbians have presented to the world arguments of an economic nature. These types of arguments appeared only when Serbia's hopes for the acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovnia from Austro-Hungarian domination were immensely reduced. Then the Serbian state policy began to press toward Salonica, in the expectation of a certain disintegration of Turkey. A huge propaganda emanated from Belgrade, and at the

same time Serbia's diplomacy was accelerated, in order to win over influential governments and to shape public opinion abroad in behalf of her pretensions over Macedonia, which were based chiefly upon economic considerations.

Serbia claims that economic needs have forced her to look toward Macedonia. If that really was the case, then why did she, even before her administrative organs were established there, deny the national name of the local Bulgarians? And after 1918, when a new and unexpected fortunate chance placed under her jurisdiction lands from the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy, why did she hasten denationalization measures against the Croatians and other nationalities? Again, was all of this for economic considerations? As soon as they set their foot in Macedonia, the Serbian authorities immediately expelled the local Bulgarian intelligentsia, the teachers, the priests, and bishops. They resorted to arrests, intimidations, and killings. They introduced a regime in Macedonia which forced the population there, even in the first few weeks after the defeat of Turkey, to pray and dream for the return of the Turkish rule. By what economic considerations were these measures introduced? In the course of twenty years, they have twice forced a change of the centuries-old Bulgarian name of the Macedonian Slavs, and by an unprecedented terrorism, once they named them Serbians, later, Yugoslavs.

Serbia cannot seek vital expansion in Macedonian provinces because they constitute Macedonia's only vital space. Macedonia is not an African land, to be considered as somebody's colony. The Serbian state had 18,784 square miles, and for her access to Salonica she wants to occupy Macedonia which has 25,096 square miles, and is inhabited by a non-Serbian population. That Serbia's policy was not necessarily shaped by economic considerations was further demonstrated by the fact that she alone was set against the idea for an autonomous or independent Macedonia. If the Adriatic, to which she is nearer, became inaccessible for her, Serbia's economic and commercial needs could be greatly

satisfied through Salonica with the creation of an independent state of Macedonia, and through mutual understanding and good neighbor relations.

In order for the reader to have a clearer picture of the unjustifiable Serbian pretensions and struggles for Macedonia, we shall use a few examples by way of comparison. First example: Let us imagine that Czechoslovakia proclaims that she has immediate need of Trieste and that she will attempt to occupy it by conquering the entire area between Vienna and the city of Passau. By such an occupation she would have subjugated from three to four million Germans, and some Italian and Slovene population. Subsequently, Czechoslovakia would declare that population as Czechoslovak by nationality. Such an action would be identical with the action of the Serbians in Macedonia. Czechoslovakia's national frontiers are approximately as far from the waters of the Adriatic Sea as the Serbian borders are from the Aegean Sea.

Second example: Hungary wants Trieste and the smaller port of Split. To attain her objective she occupies Croatia and Slovenia with six to seven millions of Slavic population, and declares it as Hungarian. But Hungary is just as far from the Adriatic as Serbia proper is from Salonica.

Third example: Switzerland suggests that she has vital need of the port of Genoa. For this purpose she attempts to take possession of the Italian provinces of the former Piedmont state, with the cities of Milan and Turin—a territory bigger than Switzerland itself, as Macedonia is bigger than Serbia. Subsequently Switzerland undertakes by fire and sword to convert the local Italian population into a different nationality.

In her aspiration toward the south, the Serbian state policy has met a stubborn resistance not only by the population of Macedonia, the bulk of which is Bulgarian, but also by the Greek state policy.

Because of Byzantium's past domination over Macedonia, historical pretensions, much greater than those of the Serbians, are advanced by the Greeks. However, against the Greek pretensions the following refutations should be pointed out: Greece of today cannot completely identify herself with Byzantium as, for example, the former Austro-Hungarian Empire cannot by all means identify herself with only one of her constituent nationalities. The Greek language and character predominated in Byzantium in the same way as, in general, the German language and atmosphere predominated in Austria-Hungary. Moreover, the Greek population did not exist in Macedonia except in the coastal cities. Besides this, the Byzantine Empire stretched its authority as far as Hungary, the Adriatic, the Caucasus, and the Crimea. The Greeks of today then should be putting forth their fantastic pretensions for all of these lands. If one looks upon the situation in this manner, then Bulgaria on her part must demand the lands as far as Budapest, Constantinople, Athens, and the Adriatic coast, since her medieval frontiers stretched to these points. By the force of this logic, then the Turks ought to move their frontiers as far as Vienna, since they twice reached that point. On the basis of historical background during the reign of Rome, it would follow that all of Europe, including England, as well as the entire coast of northern Africa and the Near East, ought to be placed under the authority of Rome, since once all of these lands were dominated by the Roman Empire. These are, of course, naive and ridiculous pretensions. But by certain countries serious political questions are made of them, and hitherto the Greeks in Athens continued to bestow upon church dignitaries medieval titles, which remind them of the once Byzantine worldly and church rule as far as the currents of the lower Danube.

It is obvious that on a historical basis the most rightful ones to lay claim upon Macedonia are the Turks and the Bulgarians. For a long time either the one or the other dominated the country and they have had, and still have, populations of their own peo-

ple. The Greeks have less claim over the country because the racial Greek population has never been numerous there, and, what is more, no Greek state rule was ever extended over Macedonia. The weakest of all claims upon a historical basis is that of the Serbians. It is incomparable with the Bulgarian and the Turkish and even with those of the Greeks.

The Greek aspirations over Macedonia, even only over the southern part of it, until recently had an entirely weak national support. We have pointed out that from the time of Byzantium until twenty-five years ago the number of the Greek population remained approximately one-fifth that of the Macedonian Bulgarians. In the entire country the Greeks never did figure more than ten to eleven per centum of the total population. And behold! The Greeks set forth the thesis that all who profess the Greek orthodox faith are Greeks! Not only the entire Bulgarian nation, but even the rest of the Christian peoples of the Balkans were declared as Hellenes (Greeks), but speaking different languages. It would be the same if the Catholics throughout the world were declared Italians, since the Catholic center originally was created in Italy, the same as the first center of Greek Orthodoxy was in the hands of the Greek clergy of the Constantinople Patriarchate.

Other means used in defense of the greater Greek thesis were the intentional falsification of the statistics. Elsewhere we mentioned that these statistics were even disproved by the Turks. During its five century-old domination, Turkey at no time was ever interested in supporting the Bulgarian national cause against the Greeks, but vice versa. Through the privileges given to the Greek Patriarchate by the Sultan ever since the fall of Constantinople (1453), the Greek clergy for centuries worked uninterrupted for the denationalization of the Bulgarian people. And yet the Turks, in the course of five hundred years, were recording in their state archives the Slavic population of Macedonia as Bulgarian. Without any doubt, the Turkish attestation regarding

the nationality of the Macedonian population must be accepted by all as the most objective.

In recent times, Greece finds support in the number of Greeks which were brought from Asia Minor and settled in Macedonia. But the important fact is overlooked that thousands of Bulgarians were forced by the Greek regime, against their will, to leave Macedonia but that their desire to return to their native places has not been extinguished.

It should be pointed out that in the Greek government there exists the idea for the expulsion of the entire Bulgarian population of southern Macedonia. Almost constantly there are put into operation various methods to drive away the Bulgarian inhabitants. Lately it seems that the favorite thought of the Greek authorities is to uproot them completely from their native soil. To this idea is given the designation of "exchange of population.[10] In reality it does not concern any exchange, since against an eventual expulsion of the Bulgarians, who have departed to

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10. A convention for "voluntary emigration" was signed on November 27, 1919, by the Prime Ministers of Greece and Bulgaria—Venizelos and Stamboliski, respectively. Actually, the "voluntary emigration" of Bulgarians from Greece became compulsory, as the Greek government employed every possible means of forcing them to leave the country. During the first years of emigration, thousands of Bulgarian families left Greece for Bulgaria. The Greco-Bulgarian convention stipulated that the departing Bulgarians should sell their real estate either themselves or by proxy, estates unsold by December 18, 1922, being left for liquidation by a mixed committee appointed for the purpose. According to a statement issued by the mixed committee, the remaining Greek debt to the Bulgarian emigrants as of August, 1931, was 1,029,378,938 levas. On June 30, 1932, the Greek government refused to pay this sum which it owed to private individuals.

"Voluntary" emigration was only one side of the problem. There still remained the question of the Bulgarian minority that had elected to remain in Greece, about 150,000 to 200,000 persons living chiefly in southwestern Macedonia. Considering them sufficiently remote from the Bulgarian frontier, the Greek government believed they would be easily assimilated and had not compelled them to emigrate. After the fall of Venizelos in 1920, it had even declared its willingness to grant certain minority rights to the Slav population. That is to say, the Greeks acknowledged the existence of a Bulgarian minority without, however, making any concession.—Translator.

Bulgaria, the latter has no Greek population within her confines to send to Greece as an "exchange". But even if she should have, such a method for the "settlement" of the Macedonian question would be most unfortunate. It would only serve to sharpen animosity and create ill-feelings. All the causes for dispute about Macedonia, as well as her neighbors' struggles, would remain. Such a solution would imply as guilty the very people who are suffering and deprived of all their rights. The impression would be given that the necessary measures had been taken for the restoration of their rights.

It was expected that the Greek state would live up to the provisions of the treaty for the protection of the minorities. Instead of answering for her prolonged maladministration of minorities, the Greek governments proposed the extermination of the Bulgarians from their native hearths. It would seem to them quite advantageous if the new world order, expected by the majority of mankind with so much hope, embraced the same injustices which they have legalized in their own state. It is not that the local inhabitants, settled in Macedonia fifteen centuries ago, ought to be expelled, but, on the contrary, that the exiled Macedonians ought to get back to their native homes. Let us recall the words of President Woodrow Wilson:

> "There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages. Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignity to another by an international conference or an understanding between rivals and antagonists. National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. 'Self-determination' is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril. We cannot have general peace for the asking, or by the mere arrangement of a peace conference. It cannot be pieced together out of individual understandings between powerful states. All the parties to this war must join in the

settlement of every issue anywhere involved in it; because what we are seeking is a peace that we can all unite to guarantee and maintain and every item of it must be submitted to the common judgment whether it be right and fair, an act of justice, rather than a bargain between sovereigns."[11]

The Macedonian territory ruled by Greece is already referred to as an indispensable granary for Greece. But before Greece acquired this land, old Greece lived for nearly one hundred years without Macedonia's wheat. Greece has need for many other foodstuffs which even today she imports from the surrounding states; for example, she imports from Bulgaria a huge number of cattle. However, if the problem is examined in the light of an independent Macedonia the question for this new Greek granary cannot be generally considered. As long as the Greek population remains in Macedonia its livelihood will be derived from the Macedonian lands, and the Greek state will no longer need to care for it. Greece could thrive and feed itself through its commerce in the same way as she always did in the past. The most renowned Greek statesman in modern times, Eleutherios Venizelos, publicly tried to convince the Greek nation during 1912 that most of the Macedonian lands, including the districts of Drama, Kavala, Seres, and as far as Salonica, ought to belong to Bulgaria. For general Balkan tranquillity and other considerations, it would be much easier for Greece now to let these districts go to constitute part of an independent Macedonian state.

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Whether or not by her own initiation, in recent times some Albanian quarters issued maps and wrote articles in which the boundaries of Albania are shown to extend as far as the Vardar

11. From President Woodrow Wilson's address to Congress on Feb. 11, 1918. See Baker, R. S., and Dodd, W. E., *War and Peace: The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (1917-1924). Harper and Brothers, Publisher, New York, I, p. 180.

River, that is, embracing almost half of Macedonia. Naturally, such assumptious attempts are ridiculous. But they also can contribute their share in the Balkan misunderstandings. In western Macedonia there is an Albanian population. It has never been disputed on the part of the Macedonian Bulgarians. The Serbians and the Greeks, however, have always wanted to oppress this Albanian population. These people live near the present Albanian state boundary. It is at a distance from the center of Macedonia, toward which the above-mentioned maps and articles are pushing Albania. The whole of western Macedonia has a preponderant Bulgarian population. The provinces in which the Macedonian Albanians live lie within Macedonia both economically and geographically. Most of them are separated from Albania by mountainous walls, as, for example, the Pyrenees separate France from Spain. Leading Albanians have logically pointed out that, since these places belong to Macedonia, they could eventually be included as separate cantons in an independent Macedonia, with the same national rights and liberties as shall be provided for the whole country.

The Bulgarians have never disputed the national entity of the Albanians or the Greeks of Macedonia.

These circumstances are of importance for everyone who wishes to investigate basically the relations of the Balkans, taking under consideration, of course, their moral state.

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The aspirations of Bulgaria on the basis of the principle of nationality is explainable. If Greece and Albania consider themselves within their right to pretend for certain small parts of Macedonia's soil where some of their fellow countrymen live, by the same token Bulgaria's pretension should be for almost the whole of Macedonia. But against the Bulgarian state tendencies, a strange argument is set forth on the part of the Serbians and

Greeks, namely, that in Macedonia there are no Bulgarians. Was it not because the Slavs of Macedonia are Bulgarian that the Greek and the Serbian regimes have introduced there the well-known reign of terror, the result of which is a sharp anti-Serbian and anti-Greek struggle? If the people there were Greeks or Serbians, why has there been a Macedonian struggle which has lasted for decades? Why is it that the population around Athens or Belgrade, where it is Greek and Serbian respectively, does not fight or protest against the Athens and Belgrade regimes, while the Macedonians do? The thesis advanced by the Serbs and the Greeks with regard to Macedonia is, in reality, the source of the sharpest misunderstandings in the Balkans. Because of this, we shall give further consideration to the question: Are the Macedonian Slavs Bulgarians?

Strange to relate there are numerous testimonials from Serbian and Greek sources showing that the Macedonian Slavs are Bulgarians. In their publications and scientific books, the Serbians only recently ceased to designate them as Bulgarians, in fact, only for the past fifty to sixty years, when their state policy toward the northern direction was frustrated by Austria-Hungary, and Serbia then pointed her attention to the south. We could also present to the reader a whole volume of Serbian official data attesting the Bulgarian character of the Macedonian Slavs. The Greeks, on the other hand, are daily falling into a strange and, to a certain extent, amusing contradiction. Their official propaganda denies the fact that there are Bulgarians in Macedonia. Nevertheless, you can hear daily, or read in Greek newspapers, how the Greek statesmen—not to mention the national Greek masses—talk against the Bulgarians of Macedonia. Whenever the Greeks want to express their contemptuous attitude toward the Macedonian Slavs, they do not hesitate to call them Bulgarians. But when the Greeks intend to deceive the outside world, then they say that there are no Bulgarians in Macedonia. The whole history of the Bulgarian nation is written by Bulgarian historians and foreign authors on the basis of documents left to us by ancient Greek writers, as well as of documents preserved

in the Vatican, in Venice, Vienna, and elswhere. In reality, at no time did it ever occur in the minds of the Greek authors of the Middle Ages to refute the Bulgarian name and character of the Macedonian Slavs. They, as well as the masses of the Greek people, considered them Bulgarians to such an extent that, after his victory in 1014 over Macedonia's Bulgarian King Samuel, the Greeks gave to the Byzantine Emperor Vasilius the title of "Bulgarian Killer". The eyes of the 15,000 Bulgarian soldiers captured as prisoners by Vasilius II were gouged, with the exception of one soldier for every hundred. Those were left with one eye so they might lead and deliver this blinded army to their Bulgarian King at Ochrida, who had fought unceasingly against Byzantium for forty years, chiefly with the strength and loyalty of the Macedonian Bulgarians.

The defenders of the Serbo-Greek thesis abroad sometimes say that the Macedonian Slavs are neither Bulgarians nor Serbs. But they do not explain to us why it was that during the course of the five century-old Turkish regime these Slavs were always declaring themselves as Bulgarians.

When, in the fourteenth century, the Serbian King Dushan succeeded in occupying some Macedonian provinces, he immediately added to his title the words, "king of the Bulgarians", another instance which shows that the Macedonian Slavs were being considered as Bulgarians.

Upon entering into Macedonia during 1912, the Serbian authorities closed 761 Bulgarian churches and 641 schools, while the Greek authorities closed 378 Bulgarian churches and 340 Bulgarian schools. Both the Serbians and the Greeks expelled from Macedonia the Bulgarian teachers and priests.

The Serbians have assiduously written for the uninformed public that the Bulgarian Exarchate had carried on propaganda, Bulgarianized the Slavs of Macedonia, and thus established the above Bulgarian churches and schools. That means, of course,

putting the cart before the horse. For long before there was a Bulgarian State and Bulgarian Exarchate, as early as 1830, to be exact, there appeared a widespread Bulgarian movement for an independent church and education. It was for the Bulgarians their greatest movement since the Turkish ascendancy in the Balkans. That was the Bulgarian Renaissance which was most enthusiastically undertaken by the Macedonian Bulgarians. Their efforts were crowned in 1870 with the creation, by a *firman* of the Turkish sultan, of a Bulgarian Exarchate, as the supreme authority of the newly recognized Bulgarian national church. Then, let us repeat, the entire Bulgarian nation was under Turkish domination, so that no one could argue that the propaganda of the yet nonexistent Bulgarian state played any part in the matter.

By its own strength and means, by its own consciousness and initiative, the Bulgarian nation carried on a struggle to an ultimate triumph. There was executed then a most significant plebiscite, through which the Bulgarian nation itself, while still under Turkish rule, indicated the extent of its ethnographic frontiers. The whole of Macedonia was included in these boundaries, as well as the entire province around the Morava River with its chief city of Nish—which later was given to Serbia by the Russian emperor in 1878.

The archives of all diplomatic chancelleries of the world, especially until 1912, are full of documents which refer to the Macedonian Slavs as Bulgarians. After 1912 the conquerors of Macedonia—the Serbian and Greek authorities—began to introduce before the world opinion their exaggerated official thesis against the nationality of the Macedonian Bulgarian Slavs. But the Macedonian liberation struggle bears witness against their contentions and in behalf of the Bulgarianism of Macedonia.

From all encyclopedias published before 1912, we learn that Bulgarians lived in Macedonia. After this year, because of alli-

ances and other political considerations, there permeated doubts in some more liberal publications with regard to the real nature of the Macedonian Slavs.

Like the scholars of different countries who were familiar with Macedonia, so also did the Turkish authorities and all the rest of objective observers, consider the Macedonian Slavs as Bulgarians. This was not upon the basis of the Bulgarian language, which they completely and logically had introduced in their schools, but on the basis of all other ethnic features by which a given nationality is judged. For centuries in Macedonia there had been no schools for Bulgarians, for other nationalities, or even for the dominating Turkish nationality. The local dialects of the Macedonian Slavs are basically considered by all as Bulgarian language. Every nationality employs its own common literary language, while in every nationality one meets different dialects. As far as the Bulgarian dialects in Macedonia are concerned, they do not vary so much from the rest of the Bulgarian dialects as, for example, do dialects among the Germans, Italian, and other nationalities. The dialect of the Germans in Switzerland is, perhaps, the most difficult to understand for all the rest of the Germans. But that did not prevent the Swiss of German origin to consider as their own the common German literary language. Precisely so, before the appearance of the regimes of national oppression in Macedonia after 1912, the native Bulgarians officially used that literary language which is common for all the Bulgarians of the world and to the construction of which the cultural workers of Macedonia have contributed a great deal.

The Bulgarian nationality of Macedonia was recognized in a series of international acts and agreements. It was more directly recognized by the Treaty of Alliance between Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria, concluded on the eve of the Balkan War (June 1912).

A long list of names of travelers, scholars, leading journalists, and diplomats from among the various cultural nations could be

compiled, which would show irrefutably that the Slavic population of Macedonia is Bulgarian. Among them are the names of the leading Slavists of the world; also the names of the great Slavic historians and Slavists, such as Kondakoff, the Czech historian Shaferick, Vatroslav Yagitch, Professor Hinderle, Florinski, Professor N. S. Derjavin, Professor Paul N. Miliyukoff, and others. It would be useless to quote here from their works. But we shall mention statesmen like Otto Bismarck, David Lloyd George, and Winston Churchill, who have definitely pointed out the same truth—that in Macedonia live Bulgarians. During the period of the first World War, Winston Churchill interceded in behalf of Bulgaria and pleaded with Serbia to cede to Bulgaria the provinces in which the Bulgarian population predominated.[12]

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12. Winston Churchill in his book, *The World Crisis,* Part II, mentions that in a memorandum of 1915 he had said the following: "Their (Bulgaria's) territorial demands are just and excellently coincide with the principle of the nationalities, which must lead us. The oppression of the Bulgarian districts in Macedonia is itself a great injustice. In the demands of Bulgaria, such as they are now presented, there is nothing which is not reasonable and respectable. . . . Right, reason, the claims of justice, and the most imperious calls to necessity alike counseled the Serbians to surrender at least the uncontested zone. . . . Till the last moment Serbia kept her heel on the conquered Bulgarian districts of Macedonia."

Since these districts ought to have been returned to Bulgaria by right, therefore ought they not be taken from Serbia in behalf of an independent Macedonia?

Mr. Churchill has had an excellent opportunity to study the mentality of the Serbian politicians and the nature of their policy during World War II. In a conversation at Cairo, after the Teheran Conference, with Dr. Bozidar Purich, Serbian prime minister of the Yugoslav exiled government in London, Churchill is reported to have said with exasperation, according the testimony of Ilija Jukic, under Secretary of Foreign Affairs in the Belgrade and exiled London Yugoslav government and a leading member of the Croatian Peasant Party, now associated with the International Peasants Union with headquarters in Washington, D. C., the following: "There are two hegemonistic aspirations in Europe which have to be destroyed for the sake of peace in it—Prussia and Serbia." See Ilija Jukic's article, "Yugoslavia: Past and Present", published in the Paris edition of the New York *Herald Tribune* of April 12, 1949.

Otto von Bismarck declared in the German Reichstag that the Bulgarian nationality inhabits Macedonia beyond Salonica on the west, and reaches in the east as far as the Black Sea.[13]

Political and strategic considerations by some of the Great Powers were the causes that Macedonia was not included in the frontiers of the Bulgarian state, which were determined by the San Stefano Treaty of 1878. This is shown by all the data of the recent past. It is found in the works of serious authors.[14] Acknowledgments in the same sense were made by some of the representatives of the Great Powers at the Berlin Congress when they were discussing the return of Macedonia under Turkish rule, and after the liberation of Bulgaria.[15]

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13. After the events of 1877 - 1878, Bismarck was asked in the Reichstag by Bennigsen, leader of the national Liberals, regarding the condition of things in the Balkan Peninsula. Bismarck answered him with the following statement: "The first point is the creation of Bulgaria, and in that connection we must first consider her boundaries, in the same light as they were discussed at the Constantinople Conference. The difference in the boundaries is not, in my opinion, of such significance as to threaten the peace of Europe.

"The Ethnographical situation of Bulgaria, as I know it from authentic sources, and as it appears in the best map I know—that of Kieper—is this: The boundaries of the Bulgarian nationality descend on the west almost without any mixture, even beyond Salonica, and reach in the east, with a very small admixture of Turkish elements, as far as the Black Sea."

See Adolph D'Avril, *The Negotiations Relative to the Berlin Treaty,* Paris, 1886, pp. 317 - 318.

14. In his book, *The Berlin Treaty,* Paris, 1878, pp. 18 and 45, Benois Brunswick writes: "Bulgaria did not receive the solution which the San Stefano Treaty had fixed for her. Strategic and political considerations compelled the (Berlin) Congress to reduce her boundaries on the southern and the western sides, thus placing outside of her authority a considerable number of her fellow-countrymen."

15. The British representative at the Berlin Congress made objections against the San-Stefano Treaty, according to which the whole of Macedonia was to be included in the frontiers of Bulgaria. Upon this occasion he pointed out that the Bulgarians are in the majority in the lands which were to be incorporated in Bulgaria by the force of the San-Stefano Treaty, and in which lands there were also found some Greeks. By these objections on the part of the English delegate it is clear that the Bulgarians are the majority in Macedonia. She was not included in Bulgaria by the decision of the Berlin Congress because of strategic and political considerations of the Great Powers, and not because the Bulgarians were not in the majority in Macedonia.

At one time there was an investigation made by individuals with well-recognized authority on the questions concerning Macedonia. That was the investigation known under the name of the "Carnegie International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars (1914)". This Commission arose as the result of the controversies and the mutual accusations among the members of the Balkan alliance—Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro—which, after their common victory over Turkey, turned to war among themselves in 1913. By all the data of this investigating Commission it is shown that the Slavic population of Macedonia is Bulgarian. Some of those members of the investigating Commission were the French senator and former minister, Justin Godart; the well-known English national figure and authority on Macedonia, Dr. H. N. Brailsford; the well-known Russian statesman and professor, Paul Miliyukoff, member of the Duma, and others.[16]

The Serbian anti-Bulgarian propaganda maintains that the Macedonian population is Serbian; the Greek propaganda argues that it is Greek; while, lately, the Balkan Bolshevik propaganda has undertaken to put forth the fiction that in Macedonia there are no Bulgarians, but some other kind of nation, namely, "Macedonian". Such a nation is not recognized by history. But a "Macedonian", in the geographic sense of the word, calls himself there a Greek, an Albanian, a Turk, or an Arumanian. A similarity could be established, for example, even in Bosnia, where

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16. The Carnegie Commission of Inquiry does not speak about any other type of Slavs in Macedonia, but only Bulgarians. The *Report* of the Commission narrates that the Bulgarian national Renaissance began in Macedonia long before there was created a free Bulgarian state. For data on the Bulgarian national character of the Macedonians see the *Report* of the Carnegie International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and the Conduct of the Balkan Wars. Washington, 1914.

By the provisions of Article X of the Sultan's *Firman* of 1870, which created the Bulgarian national Church, a plebiscite was instituted in 1872 through the dioceses of all Bulgarian lands, including those of Macedonia. Even at that time this plebiscite indicated the extent of the Bulgarian ethnic boundaries. While still under the Turkish rule, then, the Macedonian Slavs declared themselves as Bulgarians.

the Catholic Croats, the Orthodox Serbs, and the Mohammedans answer that they are "Bosnians". By this every one of them wants to tell you that he is from Bosnia, but nothing more than that, inasmuch as there exists no Bosnian nation. Of course, similar example could be shown in other countries. When someone tells you that he is Bavarian, or Saxon, or Prussian, you understand that he is German. In the ethnographic sense of the word even in Switzerland there does not exist a Swiss nation for there is no Swiss language.

Even under the communist label one sees how the Greco-Serbian chauvinists are trying to create some sort of a "Macedonian" little nation which may be expected at first to hang in the air because of its smallness but later would be swallowed by Belgrade and Athens. To facilitate this ethnographic operation, to no other local nationality is the name "Macedonian" imposed as a national name. The other groups of the Macedonian population continue to be known as Turks, Greeks, Albanians, and Arumanians. Tito readily supports the thesis for the creation of a "Macedonian" nation in order to please the Serbs from whom he has had his greatest opposition. Every step against the Bulgarian nationality rights serves as Tito's working capital for both the nationalists and chauvinistically inclined Serbian communists. The same thesis is being accepted by the Moscow Bolshevik centre, in the hope that by sacrificing the Bulgarian nationality in Macedonia, it would win over a larger number of Greeks and Serbs to foster its Balkan policy. The Bolsheviks ignore even the attestations on the character of the Macedonian Slavs contained in the historical and ethnographic works of such Russian scholars under the Bolshevik regime as Professors Derjavin and Selisheff. All these new attempts remind one of the "wisdom" exercised by the experts at the Versailles Balkan settlement in 1919. Here, too, they sacrificed the principle of justice before the plunderous chauvinism of Belgrade and Athens.

Afraid of an autonomous or independent Macedonia because there they have no fellow-countrymen, the Serbians and all others

who want to introduce measures foreign to Macedonia are attempting, with terror, to denationalize the local Bulgarian population. They are trying hard by force to make the people accept the geographic name of the country as their own national name. Sometimes they develop theories and give examples to show how it has happened elsewhere that a geographic name became national. They mention Switzerland and America. They omit the fact, however, that in America and Switzerland no external power has ever closed the schools and churches, no alien regime has ever expelled beyond the frontiers their intelligentsia, no occupier has ever resorted to murder in order to impose another national name. Moreover, all the natives of Switzerland—the French, the Germans, and the Italians—call themselves "Swiss". While in Macedonia the alien authorities do not consider the name "Macedonian" as the national name of the Greeks, the Turks, or the Albanians, but they impose it forcibly only on the Bulgarians.

No Swiss German or French or Italian will ever deny his national origin. He will never tell you that his language is "Swiss", but will name it by its real name—German, French, or Italian. No nationality in Macedonia, including the Bulgarians, wishes to have its national name changed, nor will it ever willingly permit such change.

The Macedonian liberation movement, among other things, has as one of its great purposes the elimination of all forms of oppression over the national conscience of the people. The inhabitants of the country are striving for civil and political freedom. They would be able to live in harmony and understanding among themselves only in a free and independent Macedonia. But in their national relations they wish to remain as they always have been throughout the centuries. Freedom must assure them, above all, freedom of conscience, freedom of language, and freedom of national name.

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During 1912 the four Christian states in the Balkans—Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro—formed an alliance for

the purpose, so they claimed, to free their brother Christians from the Turkish yoke. Moreover, in addition to those in Macedonia, others of their fellow-countrymen were living under the Turkish regime in other provinces. Greeks were in Epirus and the Aegean islands, not considering those in Asia Minor. Serbians and Montenegrians were found in the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar and some in Kossovo. There were Bulgarians and Greeks in Turkey. The note of the allied Balkan states, which was presented to the Sultan's government before the hostilities began, demanded Turkey to grant full rights to her Christian subjects, and to introduce an autonomous government in Macedonia.

We shall not make it our problem here to sketch in detail the development of the relations between the four allies. The truth is that, after they won the war, they entirely forgot about the contents of the above-mentioned note. They did not even care to think about, or take under consideration, the position of the Macedonian freedom movement, which stood, of course, for the autonomy of Macedonia. Proclaimed as a war of liberation, it terminated as a war of conquest. War broke out among the Allies themselves. Rumania joined Greece. Serbia and Montenegro fought against Bulgaria. Macedonia was partitioned in three parts. Greece received nearly 12,000 square miles of Macedonian territory, Serbia about 10,000 square miles, while Bulgaria less than 3,000 square miles. Turkey meanwhile, taking advantage of the situation, reoccupied Eastern Thrace with its city of Adrianople.

The cause for the interallied war, according to the Bulgarian version, was that Greece and Serbia did not wish to surrender to Bulgaria those territories in Macedonia about which they had originally agreed, and to which agreement Serbia had put her signature on a special treaty. After Turkey was more or less beaten, but while the Bulgarian army was still engaged near Constantinople against the main Turkish forces, Greece and Serbia had signed a secret understanding between them. In it they promised each other mutual aid, in order to keep the Macedonian

MACEDONIA

Divided Between Her Surrounding States—Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria.

Note: This division of Macedonia was effected by the Treaty of Bucharest (August 10, 1913) and later sanctioned by the Treaty of Neuilly (November 27, 1919).

territory occupied by their troops. According to the Serbian position and argument, by the annexation of more Macedonian provinces, Bulgaria would become much bigger, while Serbia was slated to acquire only small territories in Kossovo and the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar. Indeed, said the Serbians, according to the Treaty of Alliance it was provided for Bulgaria to take the bulk of the Macedonian territory. However, that agreement had to be discarded, since the provisions in that Treaty for Serbia's expansion over Albania and to the Adriatic could not be realized because of the strong objection by Austria-Hungary and Italy. And since there was no treaty signed between Bulgaria and Greece, the latter made a rapproachement with Serbia, guided only by her intention to acquire more territory. This, in spite of the fact that her most authoritative statesman, Venizelos, had openly declared that the bulk of Macedonia should inevitably be left to Bulgaria.

Thus, the war of liberation brought for Macedonia partition and a new form of national oppression. While the fight of the Macedonians, under Turkish regime, was carried on for the attainment of political freedom, henceforth it became an additional necessity to fight for national preservation, because the Serbian and Greek regimes undertook to denationalize the Bulgarians in Macedonia.

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The aspirations of the Balkan states did not stop at this point. Bulgaria felt severely robbed, and her fellow-countrymen in Macedonia were subjected to destruction. That is why she was awaiting the opportune moment, when, either by her own new sacrifices or with foreign help, she could correct the injustices inflicted upon her. Serbia on her part is not satisfied with the lands which she has acquired, but constantly aims to snatch more Bulgarian lands. She is now entertaining the thought of taking over southern Macedonia with its city of Salonica. Greece, on the other hand, either to strengthen her territorial gains, or to become a greater factor in the Peninsula, entertains the idea of

expanding as far as she can toward the center of Macedonia. As may be expected, each one of the three states presents arguments to justify its particular thesis. These conflicting pretensions, however, constitute the sum total of the Balkan misunderstandings which have become quite vexatious to public opinion. Nevertheless, it should be undertaken at this point to make a comparative survey of the aspirations of the Balkan state, in order that the reader might have a clearer and more exact understanding of them.

We are obliged to note here that each state followed its own national ideals. For some of them the horizon of their ideals was extending over territories found only on the Peninsula. But for Rumania and Serbia that horizon stretched northward toward the possessions of Austria-Hungary. The frontiers of the Greek ideals were drawn somewhere between Smyrna and Ankara in Asia Minor. With the formation of the Alliance against Turkey, the four Balkan states set forth to make strides toward the realization of their national lust. At that time, however, it looked as though Bulgaria alone would be able to approach the extreme achievement of her national aims, since European Turkey was the object of the Allied attack, and it was mainly there where the unemancipated Bulgarians were still living. The other three members of the Alliance, as mentioned above, were only able to receive from European Turkey small parts of territory inhabited by their fellow-countrymen. The bigger part of European Turkey should have gone to Bulgaria and to autonomous Macedonia, in which again the Bulgarians predominated. Had this occurred, of course, the freedom of the Macedonian Bulgarians would have been achieved.

However, Bulgaria's allies were beginning to feel that the augmentation of the political, military, and economic power of Bulgarianism was undesirable. Furthermore, they were unable to reconcile themselves with the thought that Bulgaria might eventually annex Macedonia. Hence, under the pretext of pre-

serving the balance of power in the Balkan Peninsula—but in reality, guided by pure egotistic considerations—there was concluded a secret Serbo-Greek Treaty against their ally, Bulgaria.

It was strange that in this instance the Balkan states alluded to the principle of the balance of power, when for decades they exerted their material and spiritual powers for the realization of their state and national ideals by erasing every vestige of balance among themselves. As they had previously used other unsuitable formulas for expansion, the Balkan governments and their sovereign heads were now seeking to use this formula—the balance of power. These governments were even infected by the spirit of Caesarism and imperialism, and maneuvered for the attainment of greatness.

During the period of 1912 to 1918—some, by their own efforts and others, with foreign aid or by dint of luck—most of the Balkan states, by theory or practice, manifested the extent of their national aspirations. Some of them managed to realize in the entirety their projected ideals; others only to a certain degree; while the third, not at all. Below is a table which briefly shows in round numbers the projected aspirations and the extent of their actual achievement. It may help in making a comparison of the different states' aspirations, and the degree of their achievement. It may also serve to show to whose benefit or harm the balance of power changed the Balkans.

Albania was created during the Balkan War. She also had her own national aspirations which were basically justifiable, since thousands of her fellow-countrymen inhabit the Kosovo province. If she would have succeeded in incorporating all districts which by right belong to Albania, this small Balkan country would have increased her territory and population by 100%.

Table Showing the National Aspiration of the Balkan States and Their Achievement During the Period of 1912 to 1918

States	As of 1912 They Had		They Expected To Have				They Actually Acquired			
					Increase of per cent				Increase of per cent	
	Square miles	Population in millions	Square Miles	Population in Millions	Square Miles	Population	Square Miles	Population in Millions	Square Miles	Population
Rumania	50,566	7	113,870	20	125%	186%	113,870	20	125%	186%
Serbia	18,528	3	96,500	14	420%	367%	96,500	14	420%	367%
Greece	25,090	3	100,360	9	300%	200%	41,688	5½	66%	83.4%
Bulgaria	37,056	4¼	69,480	8	88.3%	88.3%	39,758	5¼	7.3%	23.5%

Turkey considers herself as a European state, since she still holds 9,650 square miles of European territory, and has under her control the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, whose vital significance is well appreciated by Europe. Turkey, on her part, wished to keep under her domination all the Balkan territories which were included within her frontiers until 1912. If she had not wanted to hold them, Turkey would not have engaged in war with the allied Christian Balkan states. Exclusive of Constantinople, in Turkey's European territories there lived about 5,500,000 people, of which about 1,000,000 were Turks.

Considering the maximum achievement of the aspirations of the Balkan states, it is obvious that they had conquered provinces containing a large number of minorities. Thus, in the territories conquered by Greece, the pure Greek population hardly reached 50%. In the territories which Rumania succeeded in annexing, the minorities numbered over 50%. Serbia, later named Yugoslavia, extended her authority over lands—Macedonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slovene, Banat, and elsewhere—where the other nationalities, taken as a whole, numbered around 70%, with some large provinces in which there never lived a single Serb. Had Turkey been able to keep under her own jurisdiction the Balkan territories which she had dominated until 1912, she would have been ruling over alien nationalities which numbered nearly five times the local Turkish population. Had Bulgaria acquired during the Balkan Wars the lands desired by her, she would have acquired a Bulgarian population of 50% or perhaps 60%, if a large number of the Turkish population had fled to Asia Minor. In Macedonia, then, the per cent of the Bulgarians would have been over 60%. But neither Macedonia nor Thrace remained under Bulgaria, and only a small fraction of them was left to her.

By 1918 most of the Balkan states had realized their national aspirations, incorporating, of course, many alien populations. Even the Albanians appeared with their own state. Macedonia—

that country which had carried on a strenuous struggle for her freedom and for whose rescue the Balkan War exploded—on the other hand, received only a new and much heavier bondage. All Balkan combinations after this, all pacts and agreements concluded there, all political speculation, with hard-heartedness bypassed the terrible injustice committed to Macedonia. No signal has yet been given for an understanding among the Balkan countries on the basis of justice, without which there cannot be a happy and tranquil political future. Alliances were made between the victorious Balkan states, comprising a population of 55,000,000 people, and they invited Bulgaria to join their rapprochement only on the condition that she should not raise the question about the fate of Macedonia.

World events more than once have given a lesson to the Balkan peoples that they could unite and solidly defend themselves only if that unity is based upon justice and mutual respect. All combinations to perpetuate injustice could easily be swept away by the force of events. The Macedonian freedom movement, in the past fifty-six years, has pointed out that the first condition for unity, peace, and progress in the Balkans lies in the creation of an independent Macedonia.

The three neighbors of Switzerland—Germany, France, and Italy—together have over 150,000,000 people. In relation to Switzerland the ratio is 35:1. These nations finally agreed to leave Switzerland free and tranquil. The three neighbors of Macedonia—Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria—together have scarcely more than 20,000,000 population. In relation to Macedonia their ratio is 7:1. Yet they have permitted themselves to divide her, to fight over her, mutually devastating themselves in the past, and with no prospect that they will refrain from it in the future. The series of Balkan misfortunes makes imperative the independence of Macedonia, in the same way as similar disorders necessitated the creation of a free and separate Switzerland.

Chapter IV

The Macedonian Liberation Movement

AFTER THE French Revolution the idea for self-determination of the nations became a gospel for civilized society. This idea even now takes a place of honor among the principles referred to as a condition and guarantee for a just world settlement. During the first World War, President Wilson was the apostle of this conception, which was also embodied in the famous Fourteen Points. During World War II, the Atlantic Charter gave solemn expression to this principle. The national unity of Germany and Italy during the second half of the nineteenth century, the longings for independence and unity of many other nations, all found the most substantial support in the idea of self-determination. The Slavs, the Rumanians, the Italians, and, to a certain extent, the Hungarians, were wrested from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy on the basis of the same political credo. So when some nations were forbidden to realize their national unity, some other explanation had to be looked for. None of the responsible and authoritative factors of international politics wanted to admit that it had acted against these sacred principles.

It is understandable and quite easy to see why the Balkan nations were aspiring toward their liberation from the centuries-old Turkish yoke, and why, after its attainment, they worked for

their complete national unity. It was achieved by the Rumanians and the Serbians. The Greeks became organized into a state, but they failed to acquire the dreamed-of provinces in Asia Minor. The Bulgarians and the Albanians have not attained their complete national unity, even though the territories in which they live are in immediate proximity to the existing Bulgarian and Albanian states.

The Bulgarians, however, were formally united by the Treaty of San Stefano, after the Russo-Turkish War of 1878. It was considered that the famous Near East question, which in itself contained a series of mixed national aspirations, was entirely settled by this treaty. But then a new phase of the Eastern European question began, which even today remains dramatic. We refer here, of course, to the Macedonian question.

The design for a common state for all the Bulgarians, supported by Russia, was frustrated by the political and strategic consideration of other Great Powers, notwithstanding that their public opinion had shown sympathy toward Russia's undertaking for the liberation of the Bulgarians. At the Congress of Berlin it was decided that Macedonia would remain under Turkish authority, while Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty provided reforms for Macedonia, which virtually approached to autonomy. As on other occasions, the Turkish government, taking advantage of the ceaseless intrigues and antagonisms between the Great Powers, was able to postpone the application of those reforms. Macedonia never did receive the promised rights, so the Macedonian Bulgarians undertook to attain them through struggle. Therefore, these efforts of the Macedonian Bulgarians were the result of the Macedonian question which originated in Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty.

Until 1878 there existed no Macedonian question; there was only the problem of the Bulgarians as a whole. That is the historical truth. But it does not permit us to draw wrong conclu-

sions with regard to the concept which has been, and still is, the standard of the Macedonian movement, namely, that only in the political unity of Macedonia and the brotherhood and equality of the Macedonian nationalities could one seek the solution. If this idea had not been entertained by the founders of the movement, an independent Macedonian organization would not have been created. The Macedonian Bulgarians could then have relied only on the hope that Bulgaria would undertake to emancipate them, as the Serbs of Bosnia relied on Serbia for their deliverance, and the Rumanians in Transylvania, on Rumania, without bothering to create their own movement with its own political ideology.

The founders of the *IMRO* (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) repeatedly invited the Macedonian nationalities—Greeks, Rumanians, Albanians, and others—to unite in the fight against the tyranny of the Turkish rule, and by their common efforts to attain autonomy within the frontiers of the Turkish Empire. They even invited the collaboration of those Turks who were aware of the backwardness of the regime and of their difficult social-economic conditions.

That the struggle was justifiable is indicated by the fact that the Turks themselves resorted twice, in the first quarter of this century, to revolution against the Sultan's regime, and finally eliminated it. Even Albanians and Arabs revolted, although they were fanatical Mohammedans, and the Sultan was the Caliph of the entire Mohammedan world.

The leaders of the Macedonian liberation movement set forth as their ultimate goal only autonomy. For this stand they earned the sympathy of all adherents to the Balkan solidarity, who comprised an overwhelming majority of the liberated Bulgarians in Bulgaria. They felt that only through the attainment of this goal would their subjugated fellow-countrymen be assured of a balanced national development. There is nothing astonishing in

seeing the portraits of great Macedonian fighters in the Bulgarian history textbooks that were used in the Bulgarian schools. The *IMRO* deemed it acceptable that Bulgaria should not dominate Macedonia. It found little ground for Greece to acquire Macedonian lands, and absolutely none for Serbia. At a time when the principle for national unity was most respected, the Macedonian workers cheerfully recommended friendly cooperation with other nationalities, without affiliating themselves with Bulgaria. They put forth only one condition: European guarantee for Macedonian autonomy.

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The *IMRO* had an immediate task: to provoke the Great Powers' intervention to force Turkey to grant the autonomy. To bring about this intervention, the only effective method was an insurrection. No Balkan state had ever succeeded in liberating itself without resorting to arms. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, uprisings were provoked by the Serbs, Rumanians, and the Greeks. In the second half of the same century, insurrection broke out in Bulgaria. Macedonia had to follow the same course. To this task the initiators of the Macedonian revolutionary movement had dedicated themselves wholeheartedly. They soon attracted hundreds, and later thousands, of intellectual Bulgarians; then, with unexpected rapidity, the whole Bulgarian people in Macedonia—even the poorest mountaineers. Without any reservation the idea was embraced by the greater part of the Arumanians, who have been recorded in many exploits of the struggle.

The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization *(IMRO)* originated in Salonica during 1893. At the beginning it consisted entirely of isolated conspiratory groups in many villages and towns of the country. Soon its net embraced all Bulgarians, and the oath of loyalty to the movement was sworn at mass meetings in churches, schools, or in the forests. Women, too, participated actively in the conspiracy. Village, district, and provincial

committees were established, and at the head of the entire organization was a central committee of three members with equal power and responsibility. An institute of armed *chetniks* was created. The *chetniks'* bands might be considered as small mobile garrisons of the organization with headquarters everywhere and nowhere. Their immediate function was to execute the decisions of the district and provincial committees, as well as those of the central committee, in various ways—agitation, administering justice, procurement of arms, collecting money, supervision of education and economic undertakings, and so on. A secret armed militia existed in every village or town. A secret postal service functioned from one end of the country to the other. Many of the functions of the state were undertaken by this invisible organization.

It is not necessary to dwell in detail here on the development of the revolutionary struggle, which has already a half-century of history. It is perhaps the most renowned liberation struggle in the modern history of the Balkans. In its method of organization, and the mass participation in it, the *IMRO* has never had another competitor in the Balkans. During the insurrection of the Bitolia province in 1903, ten per cent of the population resorted to arms—almost as many as any modern state usually mobilized. The rest of the population in the district helped the insurgents in every possible way. Many inhabitants of the Bitolia district, who were working in distant Constantinople, upon receiving the news of the pending uprising, returned to their villages and joined the insurrection groups. Seldom had such national mass revolts been found among the Balkan peoples! Josef Pilsudski pointed out that during the time of the famous Polish insurrection in 1863, hardly one per cent of the population in the affected districts was able to join the uprising.

However, when we speak of the Macedonian movement, we do not mean only the *IMRO*. The legal Macedonian liberation movement is just as old. The emigrated Macedonians have organ-

ized themselves to help their oppressed fatherland. The important object of their work is the enlightenment of public opinion in Bulgaria and abroad. They have made presentations before responsible governments, international organizations, and humanitarian associations of the world. Macedonian emigrants' associations are found principally in Bulgaria and America. There are student associations in many of the big cities of Europe. In Bulgaria, as well as in other countries, newspapers and books are published, while in Macedonia itself, secret revolutionary publications were formerly issued.

After the Young Turk revolt in Turkey, 1908, it became possible for a short time to carry on a legal fight for rights. At that time parliamentary elections were held in Macedonia, political clubs were organized, and the *IMRO* disbanded its cadres. During 1910, however, it had to recall them since it became obvious that the country could not attain its objective under the Young Turks' regime.

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In contrast to the Greek and Serbian armed bands in European Turkey, the Macedonian Organization is a native movement of the Bulgarian population. That is confirmed by all foreigners who had the opportunity over a period of time to study conditions on the spot. Among them is the authoritative English public figure, H. N. Brailsford, who wrote:

"The Serbian cause in Macedonia proper is in consequence a negligible and artificial movement. It exists only so far as it pays its way, and in so far as the Turks encourage it as a counterpoise to the menacing Bulgarian agitation (p. 103)..... The Serbian movement is a purely official agitation, guided and financed in Belgrade; whereas despite the sympathy of Sofia, the Bulgarian Revolutionary committee is a genuine Macedonian organization."[17]

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17. Brailsford, H. N., *Macedonia: Its Races and Their Future*, London, 1906. p. 103 and p. 376.

In reality, the Serbian armed bands which appeared in the Macedonian villages near the Serbian frontiers were nothing more than ordinary agents of the Serbian ministry of war and the interior. These bands had no ideology of their own. Their political thinking and the management of their purely anti-Bulgarian activity in Macedonia were done by the state authorities of Serbia, relying on Turkish benevolence. The Greek armed bands which Athens dispatched into some of the districts in southern Macedonia were welcomed by the local Greek population, while the Serbian bands had to rely exclusively upon bayonets and money in order to assure for themselves shelter within the poor border villages. These two foreign propaganda mediums united against the *IMRO* and terrorized the Bulgarians. Inspired by their respective state centers, the Greco-Serbian armed bands' movements were far removed from the idea of Macdonian autonomy. Their predetermined objective was to impede its realization, since they feared the preponderant Bulgarian majority in the country. The Turkish condescending stand toward them is explainable, since their purpose was to attack the *IMRO,* and, of course, the Turks continued to hope that the more obstacles there were for the *IMRO,* the less chance there would be for Macedonian autonomy.

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The people's movement, headed by the *IMRO,* worked jealously for Macedonian independence. From the time of its creation, efforts were made to secure its submission to certain alien politics and foreign factors. The most serious of these were two attempts—the one from the right, and the other from the left. We might call "right" the attempt of the well-known Supreme Committee, which half a century ago organized for the first time the Macedonian emigration in Bulgaria. Falling for a certain time under the influence of extreme nationalists, the Committee made an effort to subordinate the *IMRO.* It attempted to capture the organization by dispatching from Bulgaria *chetas* (groups of armed *chetniks*—Translator) to some of the frontier districts

under Turkish rule, where the people for quite some time had already entered the ranks of the *IMRO* and were zealously arming themselves. A fight developed among the Bulgarians, which today is still a tragic memory.

The *IMRO* won, and the movement of the Supreme Committee, which had had the support and the evil undercover help of influential state circles in Sofia, was terminated. On the side of the *IMRO* stood the more democratic circles in Sofia and the bulk of the intelligentsia. The *IMRO's* position, its independence, and its longing for the autonomy of Macedonia—and not annexation with Bulgaria—were inspiringly defended before the Bulgarian officialdom by the writings of many leading men of Bulgaria's cultural elite. One among them was the great poet, P. K. Yavoroff, who, with rifle in hand, worked for the freedom of Macedonia. Thus, at the time when Macedonia was still under Turkish domination, the *IMRO* carried on war simultaneously against the annexational policies of her neighbors—Belgrade, Athens, and Sofia. That fight is one of the greatest reprehensions for all who have attempted to question the independence of the Macedonian liberation movement and its aspiration toward the political resuscitation of Macedonia.

During the Turkish regime attempt was also made from the "left" to infiltrate the *IMRO*. This attempt was confined to only one of the revolutionary districts and touched a limited number of people. But the left infiltrations, generously aided with means from Bolshevik centers, made strides between the two World Wars. Before the Soviet troops entered the Balkans, the progress of these efforts was insignificant. The Macedonian movement heroically defended itself and did not permit the Third International to achieve its designs. This defense should take an important place in the pages of history of the Macedonian cause. With it the Macedonians made numerous and costly sacrifices.

From its independence the movement never retreated. In

the name of that independence, the movement more than once was involved in conflicts with Bulgarian parties and governments. In this respect one could refer to the attestations of competent foreign observers. Alfred Rappoport, very familiar with the situation in Macedonia, where he was Austrian delegate to superintend the application of the Murzteg reforms, wrote:

"Never has the Macedonian Organization renounced its own complete independence in relation to the Sofia government. Naturally, during the three wars, it kept account of the necessity of military discipline, but did that as an ally and not as a subordinate. In times of peace, that independence was more obvious and the entire modern history of Bulgaria must be written, in order to indicate the numerous phases of the Bulgaro-Macedonian relation. Regardless of the natural feeling of national solidarity, never were those relations so close, as for a long time were the relations between the Belgrade and Athens governments with their respective national propagandas, which operated in Macedonia during the last years of Turkish domination and even later."[18]

Consistent with its independence there manifests itself also the nonpartisanship of the Macedonian movement. In the subjugated country itself the Macedonians were not permitted to have their own parties. It could have attained some benefits only through its tactical relations with one or the other party of the subjugator. Nevertheless, separate emigrants did belong to different Bulgarian parties, but they placed the interests of the liberation movement above party interests. In that sense the nonpartisanship of the movement had the appearance of a dogma. Only the few communists among the emigrants wanted to introduce party ideology into the Macedonian organizations. All the rest were conscious that the movement held its own traditional ideology, imposing, above all, unity around the idea of liberation.

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18. Rappoport, Alfred, *Au Pays Des Martyrs*, Paris, 1927, p. 62.

The *IMRO* shows itself as the only democratic organization until now which has come forth from among the revolutionary movements in the Balkans. It is democratic by its ideals and organization. The *IMRO* reflects in itself the people's traditions. Questions of public nature among the Macedonian Bulgarians were always decided through deliberations and conferences. The traditional national institutions, the associations, which existed especially in the cities during the Turkish regime, were expressions of the people's democratic spirit. The committees of the *IMRO* from those in the villages and up to the central committee were elected by delegates which in turn were chosen by the people. Provincial, district, and general congresses were convoked every three or four years, except, of course, if unusual circumstances interrupted them. In reference to the *IMRO's* democracy, the previously quoted British authority on Macedonia, Brailsford, wrote: "The movement became democratic as well as revolutionary (p. 116)..... But in a practical and quite clear-sighted way, they did become a real people's party. Their decisions are taken by general conferences, which contrive in some mysterious way to meet once or twice a year in the very heart of Macedonia. Their leaders are elected, from the president of the whole organization down to the chiefs of each village band." (p. 117)

"The unique feature of the Bulgarian (Macedonian—Translator) Committee is that it is a democratic organization, whose policy and programme are directed by Macedonian public opinion (p. 121)..... Its chiefs are Bulgarians by language and nationality, but their programme had never aimed for the annexation of Macedonia to Bulgaria." (p. 122).[19]

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19. Brailsford, H. N., *Macedonia: Its Races and Their Future,* London, 1906, p. 117, p. 121, p. 122. The above book was published by Dr. Brailsford after the Ilinden insurrection of 1903 in the Bitolia district. In his book the author gives interesting details about the different nationalities in Macedonia, but more exhaustively he considers the heroic steadfastness of the Macedonian Bulgarians during the time of the insurrection and after it.

According to the *IMRO's* by-laws, any person of the various nationalities in Macedonia could become a member, even though he might entertain different political convictions, as long as he or she accepted the aims of, and conformed with, the discipline of the *IMRO*. We again emphasize that no other Balkan liberation movement has ever been so liberal in its political, social, and national understanding as the *IMRO*. To be convinced, one should compare its program and by-laws. Also no other fighting organization or any political party in the Balkans has ever embraced such a large mass of the people as is the case with the *IMRO*.

It is hardly necessary to add that the *IMRO,* by its aims and activities, is not a destructive but is a constructive organization. There is nothing anarchistic or opportunistic about it. Notwithstanding the duration of the struggle, which has been forced upon it by the conquering regimes, the *IMRO* untiringly has stirred the people toward creativeness, while it has taken the initiative for the formation of numerous constructive, cultural, educational, health, and economic projects. It perceived the necessity for the material and spiritual uplift of the people as a lofty purpose.

Elsewhere we have pointed out *IMRO's* immense contribution in freeing the peasants from Turkish Middle Age feudalism by causing the transfer of ownership of the land to the peasants. Much more than furnishing of arms and the gospel of revolt, the *IMRO* has brought to the mass of the people books for reading, lectures in hygiene, education, industry, and economic progress. Through *IMRO's* initiative many churches and schools were built, also mountain health resorts and, at places, hospitals. There were organized mutual aid groups, evening schools, forest and other corporations, water syndicates, libraries, sport societies, musical groups, tourist associations, and so on.

In the interest of the public it was possible, naturally, to achieve much more during the Turkish regime. The succeeding

Serbian and Greek regimes did not allow Bulgarian social associations even of the most innocent form. To some it may seem improbable, but the *IMRO* suggested and inspired the beginnings of more legal and cultural establishments than of revolutionary actions. For the establishment of legal projects and experiments the *IMRO's* expenditure of funds was as much as the means consumed by its revolutionary and combat activity. Many of the *IMRO's* efforts were invested in healing the wounds and rebuilding destructions inflicted upon the people by the conquerors of Macedonia. As the principal reason for its appearance in the world was to fight against slavery, so also by its daily inclinations and suggestions, the *IMRO* became a progressive factor and bearer of culture. Inasmuch as it succeeded in directing public life, the *IMRO* at least introduced more and better security, greater social and spiritual order, than the states dominating Macedonia ever succeeded to assure. Parallel with this, the *IMRO* has made every effort to conserve the people's blood. The *IMRO* has never forgotten that it is representative of a people which is small in number. The struggle undertaken by the *IMRO* is basically a legal defense. The cause for the fight rests upon the oppressors who have encroached on the liberty, property, and the life of the people. Likewise were also imposed on the *IMRO*—never on its own initiative—all other alien fronts against which the *IMRO* had to undertake the fight.

Up to now, the ideals of the *IMRO,* as well as the by-laws of 1893, have not been changed. The course of events, which shook the Balkans during the past half-century, justified the *IMRO's* political aims. Its political aim—"free and independent Macedonia"—justified even the communistic differences of opinion. Despite the familiar discipline and solidarity of the communistic world, in connection with Macedonia we are now witnessing sharp disputes between the communistic governments and organizations of the Balkan states.

In the first place the *IMRO* is against national oppression.

In order for each nationality to be able to make progress and to build its national culture, the *IMRO* wants, and stands for, complete equality of all nationalities in Macedonia. In this sense alone must be understood the extreme nationalism of the *IMRO's* workers. The *IMRO* is against the imposition of foreign factors in Macedonia. The *IMRO* itself has never sought to impose itself upon others. The Macedonian emigration in Bulgaria likewise has never manifested rivalry for power within Bulgaria's public life. The Macedonian Bulgarian public figures, however, that all Bulgarians owe moral support to the struggle for the liberation of Macedonia. It figures, regardless of the considerations, that the Bulgarian political parties and statesmen should, at least, feel nearer to the Bulgarian minorities in the surrounding countries than to the parties or groups in the countries dominating Macedonia. The Macedonian liberation movement with great pain has met the obstacles added to it by the Bulgarian governments. There has never been an occasion when the *IMRO* disregarded the interests and the existence of the Bulgarian state. The ideas of the Macedonian leaders appear entirely imbued by the spirit of freedom and democracy. The *IMRO* would not give to anyone a single degree of authority to oppress, whomever it may be, in Macedonia. The *IMRO* stands for complete freedom and equality of rights for all nationalities in Macedonia.

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Was it necessary during the Turkish regime to resort by all means to armed struggle? We have already cursorily said that all Balkan peoples, to liberate themselves from Turkish domination, resorted to arms. But the truth is that during the Turkish regime there never did exist an assimilative policy. And after five centuries of dark bondage, the nationalities in Turkey survived and saw their political renaissance. During their overrun in the Balkans, the Turks had, in places, converted to Mohammedanism part of the Christian population. After that, all Christian nationalities were left undisturbed. They were left to live

in the same backwardness and poverty in which the Sultans held even the Mussulman population.

The only difference was that the Mussulmans reserved for themselves the sword, their blood in the battlefields, and felt themselves masters over the property, labor, and the honor of the Christians. The Christian nationalities could have avoided resorting to revolts or other revolutionary means, but their life would have been just as happy as that of an eagle with clipped wings. The longing of the Christian subjects toward progress appeared evil to the reactionary old Turkish ruling class. Their attempts to gain civil and political rights fell under the suspicion that it was aimed at the wresting of the Christian provinces from the empire. Inevitably, all legal initiatives in the long run terminated with armed conflicts. These, of course, were considered an insult to the Sultan's absolute power and their all-powerful political representatives.

The Christians, especially the Macedonian Bulgarians, needed to free themselves from spiritual, political, and economic oppression. Having in view how affairs developed a little earlier in Bulgaria, and before that in the rest of the Balkan countries, the founders of the *IMRO,* well familiar with the conditions in Macedonia, resorted to the creation of a revolutionary movement.

The question, whether or not while under the Turkish regime illegal action was absolutely imperative, presents itself now and then among the Macedonian circles, because of the fact that the Macedonians never expected to fall under Greek and Serbian bondage, which is incomparably far more heavy and cruel than was that of the Turkish regime. Because of their experience under the Greco-Serbian tyrannical regimes, the Macedonians have begun to judge—post factum—that the Asiatic-Turkish regime was idyllic in comparison with the Greco-Serbian oppressions inflicted upon them, and that, consequently, since national existence was possible under the Turks, it would have been much

better not to have resorted to revolutionary struggle against them.

However, the history of many European nations, as well as that of America, is eloquently convincing that if any other people were in the place of the Macedonian Bulgarians they, too, would have resorted to revolt against a regime such as that of the Sultans. Many revolutions were executed by the western nations against regimes under which there were not the appalling injustices as existed in old Turkey, and which had far less national oppression than the vivid examples given us by the Greek and Serbian regimes.

If it is again necessary to explain why the Macedonian Bulgarians, and with them the other nationalities, are illegally carrying on a fight against the Serbian and Greek Christian regimes, we shall quote an objective foreign observer, the well-known contributor to the *Christian Science Monitor,* R. H. Markham. He has for decades studied the conditions in the Balkans, and today may be considered one of the most competent persons of the western world on questions and problems of southeast Europe. Mr. Markham writes:

" . . . And why is there no voice of protest in 'Serbian' Macedonia, as there is in Croatia? Why do not the Macedonians show their national and racial demands through a vote? Ah! tell me, why doesn't a chained horse run away? Why doesn't a man with gouged eyes see? Why doesn't a man with amputated legs dance? Why doesn't a man with tied hands play a violin?

"Why is there not a political party in Macedonia? Because Belgrade does not permit that. There one cannot even use the Serbian language to talk about the Macedonian race. There they can have neither a party, meeting, a newspaper, nor a candidate for national representative. The people there cannot vote for their own man, neither can they present their rights, nor lodge a complaint, nor even show signs of its existence. Every living

people has the right to live. The Macedonians, who have preserved their way of life for a thousand years, are a living people and have the right to live. And, certainly, they will fight for such life. If Serbia should grant them their rights, as any other peace-loving group, they would fight for, and constitute a powerful part of Yugoslavia. If Serbia should refuse to gratify their rights, they would struggle through a secret organization. The Macedonians are used to deprivations and do not expect too much from the world. Their demands are extremely modest.

"But these demands cannot be ignored. They are the soul of the people. They are Macedonianism. In a word, these demands are for the right to live. Whenever the people refuse to avail themselves of this minimum right, they are already no longer people.

"By one or another method the Macedonians shall work for the right to live. How they work, would depend on Serbia. In Belgrade they ought to ask why is there a Macedonian organization. The Serbian government should have the answer."[20]

R. Davis and Ben Reilly, both members of the British House of Commons, made a visit to Macedonia under Serbian rule, in order to familiarize themselves with existing conditions there. The Serbian police interrupted their tour in the country.

Mr. Davis in a talk before a Macedonian group in the United States, among other things said:

"A coward is that Macedonian who is not in the Macedonian organization and who does not fight for the destruction of the Yugoslav tyranny. For every Macedonian knows that in his fatherland there is neither a shadow of freedom nor a system of

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20. Veritas, *Macedonia Under Yoke,* a publication of the Macedonian National Committee in Sofia. The quotation is from Markham's article written in 1924 and incorporated in this publication.

justice. Even I, as a foreigner, cannot endure the things which I saw in Yugoslavia."[21]

In such a case of tyranny what should be the attitude of the Macedonian movement toward Yugoslavia? Some of the friends of Macedonia openheartedly have been in favor of a Big Yugoslavia, in which to incorporate all the southern Slavic people. But the *IMRO's* interpretation of this matter, as well as that of the entire Macedonian movement, could be summarized in the following general way:

There does not exist a Yugoslav nation, there is no Yugoslav tradition, and one cannot speak of a Yugoslav language. Likewise, there is not, for example, a Westernslav nation, language, and traditions, but there are Poles, Czechoslovaks, etc., with their clearly defined history. The southern Slavic people have their own separate historical development and distinct national consciousness.

The Yugoslav problem between the two World Wars was nothing more than a struggle of the majority of the Yugoslav nations against the efforts of the Serbians to subordinate and gradually assimilate them. With regard to the Macedonian Bulgarians, the Serbian authorities had already denied them as a nation and had proclaimed them simply as "Serbians".

Seldom has there been a state so undesirable to the nations living in it, as Yugoslavia. In this respect she could be compared only with Abdul Hamid's Turkey. Both of them were sustained only through the political support given to them by distant foreign nations. But still, in Hamid's Turkey there were never such denials of rights and such oppression as in Yugoslavia.

At no time in the past has Macedonia ever entertained any

21. *The Macedonian Tribune,* Indianapolis, Indiana, October 28, 1937, No. 558.

idea of Yugoslavism. Insofar as Macedonian leaders have made conciliatory declarations with relation to Yugoslavia, they meant simply that the *IMRO* was ready to refrain from revolutionary actions, and was ready to pass over to legal means only upon conditions that would make legal activities possible. This meant that the *IMRO's* demands presented in behalf of the Macedonian Bulgarians and the rest of the inhabitants there should be executed.

In a big Yugoslavia, the quarrels and the division in the Balkans would be accelerated instead of eliminated, because there live in the Peninsula many other peoples which are numerically as large as the number of the southern Slavs taken together. Then, if we take under consideration the fact that Turkey considers herself a Balkan state, with her the numerical strength of the others becomes twice as large. The aspirations toward the creation of a Yugoslavia from Trieste to the Black Sea awakens in a big way the specter of war, and provokes distant and neighboring distrusts.

Macedonia has never gravitated northward in the direction of Serbia. Neither the Bulgarians, nor the Macedonian Turks or Greeks ever had any dealings along that line. Never by historical connection, nor common mentality, nor national consciousness were they placed in contact with Serbia. There are no economic, cultural, or psychological reasons, not even considerations, for peace and justice or for unity and harmony in the Peninsula, which could validly dictate that Macedonia be left within the frontiers of Yugoslavia. Exactly the opposite—to hold Macedonia in the pincers of Yugoslavia means to disregard all of the above-stated considerations, and, more particularly, to work against the principle of nationality. In the beginning, Macedonia, without any action or desire on the part of her population, was forcibly dragged into Serbia. Now she is being dragged into Yugoslavia by labeling her population from time to time—on paper only—with a new name, now Serbs, then Yugoslavs or Macedonians; or Old Serbs, Southern Serbia, or Vardar *banovina,* and now, finally, as a Federal Republic.

The police state regime, the national oppression, the plundering of the people, the extermination of all national manifestations have not ceased. Whatever state policy existed during King Alexander's regime, the same conditions exist under the Yugoslav Bolsheviks. That is why the idea of Yugoslavism and a general Yugoslav state, for which there has never been any kind of historical and traditional root in Macedonia, has become synonymous with tyranny, injustice, and enslavement. If there is anything from which Macedonia would like to free herself, it most assuredly is Yugoslavism, and Yugoslavia.

That Macedonia has never taken a determined stand either for Serbia, or for Yugoslavia, but only against them, is shown by the ceaseless struggle of the Macedonian organizations. It is shown also by the attitude of the mobilized Macedonians in the Serbian or Yugoslav army. Retaining their arms and equipment they sneaked away in mass desertions, and at opportune times fought against Serbian detachments.

The proponents of the Yugoslav idea are endeavoring to attract the Macedonians with the prospect of including all of Macedonia into a greater Yugoslavia, even taking away the Macedonian districts dominated by Greece and Bulgaria. This is interpreted by the Macedonians only as an attempt on the part of Serbia or Yugoslavia to conquer the remainder of Macedonia, including Salonica. The Macedonian movement considers, in order to achieve the pacification of the Balkan states through the resuscitation of Macedonia, that it is much better not to include any Macedonian territory even in Bulgaria. It should be understood, therefore, that the Macedonian movement cannot even think of giving Macedonian lands to Serbia or any one else.

There is not a single basis which warrants the surrender to Yugoslavia of that part of Macedonia which is under Bulgarian jurisdiction. In Bulgarian Macedonia nationality rights of all minorities are respected, while their political and civil rights are

guaranteed just as much as those of the rest of the citizens of the Bulgarian state. That territory should be ceded by Bulgaria only if it would be included into a united and independent Macedonian state. The willingness for such a step was again disclosed by Bulgaria at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. There are no advantageous reasons to call for the transfer of southern Macedonia from one oppression to another—from Greek to Serbian or Yugoslavian.

Concerning the non-Slavic nationalities of Macedonia—Turks, Albanians, Rumanians, Greeks, and Jews—it is obvious that they would prefer to be citizens of an independent Macedonia rather than of Yugoslavia. For them, the representation of some sort of Yugoslav ideal is of no interest. They, as well as the Macedonian Bulgarians, see the pacification and unity of the Balkans not in a great Yugoslavia, but more expeditiously, in a Balkan federation or confederation. No Slavic motives are alluded to by the Macedonian liberation movement. It wishes to become an independent Macedonia serving as a friend of all neighboring and distant peoples. Such a stand would be undertaken particularly because of her geographic situation, and also because Macedonia is populated by various nationalities.

Did all participants in the Macedonian movement remain to the end consistent and loyal to the *IMRO's* dogma, especially to its political ideal for autonomy? We cannot claim that all remained consistent at all times. But based upon their feeling and the stand which they have taken, we can affirm the loyalty and the consistency of the majority of the leaders of the movement and the national mass of the people. Occasionally, during the period of recent wars, some responsible individuals showed interest in behalf of the principle of autonomy for Macedonia. Other individuals deviated from this fundamental principle and accepted, during some of these wars, the idea of annexation to Bulgaria.

Although we condemn them, there is nothing unusual in these manifestations. Consider the countless sufferings of the Bulgarian population in Macedonia, because of their struggle to win autonomy. Remember, too, that the Greeks on their part showed no willingness for cooperation in the fight for autonomy, but pursued a policy of partitioning Macedonia. Do not forget that the Serbians continued their assaults with armed bands and all other possible means against the Macedonian cause. Furthermore, Turkey, for thirty-four years after the Berlin Treaty, avoided introduction of the promised reforms—which might have eventually led to autonomy—and she thought about these reforms only after her defeat at Lule-Burgas.

It is explainable, therefore, why even in the ranks of the movement for the Macedonian cause there were individuals who, guided by the love of their nation (never because of hatred toward the other nations), were strongly led by the desire to wrest their subjugated brothers from bondage, and reconciled themselves with the decision to incorporate within Bulgaria at least the maximum Macedonian districts in which the population is Bulgarian. These individuals, however, never did reject on principle the idea of autonomy and of an independent Macedonia. They themselves for a long time fought for it; they tried by all possible means to realize it.

This partial deviation in the Macedonian circles was due for the most part to disappointment because of the Great Powers' failure to support a just settlement of the Macedonian question, and not because of the conviction that it had lost its hope for deliverance of Macedonia and the Balkans. But we emphatically state that the movement as a whole did not deviate. Until the present, the constitutions and by-laws of all legal and illegal[22]

22. "Illegal", or active organizations were those composed of *chetniks,* who were members of a *cheta* (armed band). These fought openly with arms for the liberation of Macedonia. "Legal", or passive organizations are those composed of any ordinary local group or society which through speeches, literature, articles, newspapers, and other publications advocate the freedom and independence of Macedonia.—Translator.

organizations have the same aims and objectives which were proclaimed at the time of the launching of the *IMRO* in 1893. Of course, the partial deviation of certain individuals of the Macedonian public has not been the reason for the unachieved ideal. In general, these reasons are remote from the Macedonian movement. They are, as we have mentioned elsewhere, to be found in the politics of the Balkan and the big European states.

The deviations referred to above apply only to the period of the first World War. During the second World War that public and the responsible Macedonian workers remained completely aloof from Bulgaria's state politics. The Macedonian public never did accept as a solution to the Macedonian question that which was proffered during 1915—1918, and again during 1941—1944, namely, the partial annexation to Bulgaria of Macedonian districts.

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With no less courage and self-abnegation, the Macedonian struggle, by its long duration, surpasses the liberation efforts of the other Balkan nations. The sacrifices which Macedonia has rendered are enormous. Scarcely a European nation, even during the wars, has given such a per centum of killed, sufferings, and expulsions. Nearly 500,000 Bulgarians—30% of their total number there—were forced to emigrate. Had they been able to remain in their fatherland, the Bulgarian nationality in Macedonia would have numbered nearly 2,000,000 people. Thousands of fighters and innocent inhabitants have perished, not counting those who fell in battle in the armies of the various Balkan states controlling the country. During the Turkish regime a great number of people were thrown into prisons, mostly in the fortresses of Asia Minor and the Aegean Islands. According to the Turkish official statistics during the period of the *IMRO's* underground development (1893—1903), 3,764 Bulgarians were arrested, 2,503 were tortured, 364 were killed, 103 were exiled, 503 were sentenced—some to death—385 homes were burned, and 825 homes were plundered.

During the insurrection of 1903, nearly 300 villages with more than 12,000 houses were devastated, 3,122 women were violated, 4,694 innocent Bulgarian persons were killed. About 75,000 persons were left homeless. There were 25,000 insurgents battling against a Turkish army of 250,000 soldiers. More than 30,000 people emigrated to Bulgaria and America. Nearly 6,000 insurgents and troops fell. From 1903 to 1912, in connection with outrages, skirmishes, and so on, there perished several thousand more Bulgarians, while other thousands were thrown into prisons. At the time of the process of the disarmament in 1910, in addition to the mortality cases and mutilations, wholesale violations of young and old occurred in several districts.

During the Serbian and Greek regimes, tens of thousands of people passed through the prisons and subsequent internments. During the two Serbo-Greek dominations—the first time from 1912 to 1915, the other, from 1919 to 1941—at least 100,000 Macedonians were physically beaten. Millions of dollars were extracted from the people's pockets and from their personal and real property through fines, confiscations, and outright plunders. The Serbian regime instituted its own kind of a "state control", in the form of terroristic bands, which for years roamed systematically from village to village with the purpose of intimidating the inhabitants, by beating the men and women. These terroristic bands quartered and fed in the Bulgarian homes without payment upon leaving, and, as a rule, filled their knapsacks with objects of young women's hope chests. From the very outset the Serbian authorities in Macedonia dispatched such bands, which, particularly in the region between the Vardar River and the Bulgarian frontier, did not fail to visit a single village and put its inhabitants under wholesale beatings. The brutalities inflicted upon the Bulgarian population were dreadful. In many instances, people were compelled to dig their own graves and were buried while still alive. There were even cases of individuals being burnt alive.

Unable to liquidate the armed resistance, the Greek and Serb-

ian authorities poured out their wrath upon the population. Government officials resorted to wholesale massacres.

Great losses were also incurred by the country as a result of the wars which unfolded over its territory. During 1913, nearly 14,000 Bulgarian homes in the eastern Macedonian districts were set on fire by the advancing Greek army. During the first World War, there occurred new destructions, new thousands of homeless peasants and city folk. Destructions and untold sufferings were also brought by the first Balkan war against Turkey, as well as by the second World War.

A policy of pillage and impoverishment of the people was carried on, and all well-to-do families were completely ruined. No one was permitted to establish or incorporate a business enterprise. The credit was managed by the police and the banks were their collaborators in exerting the pressure of denationalization. There was no progress in the economic sense, but, inversely, every possible effort was made to bring about the material ruination of the country.

The schools were inadequate. Instruction was given in a language foreign to the people. Even the Holy Scripture in the Bulgarian language was not permitted to be used.

That which was narrated in the earlier part of this book about the imaginary picture of an oppressive regime in Switzerland actually existed in Macedonia in far deeper color and greater proportion. All the freedom of the people was taken away, and there was hardly a right that was not trampled. The people lived in eternal fear, want, debasement, exploitation, and terror.

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Quite cursorily summarized, the following are the stages through which the Macedonian liberation movement has passed

since 1893 to the present:

1. Until 1903 was the period of secret preparedness, during which there occurred in the country numerous incidents, discovery of arms caches, and skirmishes between the armed revolutionists and the Turkish troops.

2. During 1903 the Ilinden insurrection was proclaimed, the result of which effected no improvement for the lot of the population. The Great Powers paid no attention to the blood shed by the subjugated people. Also, with the Macedonian Bulgarians, sacrifices were rendered by the Macedonian Arumanians, who, with valor, participated in the ranks of the *IMRO,* because they, too, were, and to the present still are, threatened by Greek encroachments upon their nationality.

3. From 1903 to 1908 the struggle continued not only in Monastir, the original province of the insurrection, but also in the rest of the districts. The world press continued to be filled with news about Macedonia. The diplomatic chancelleries were under quite a strain. All sorts of evaluations, counsel, and proposals, on the part of the different diplomatic circles, were interwoven in connection with the uncertainty of the Balkan situation. However, even the Murzsteg reforms, which were drafted for Macedonia by the action of Austria-Hungary and Russia, did not improve conditions. These reforms were proposed after the above-mentioned insurrection as well as the previous one which had flared up in some districts of northeastern Macedonia during 1902.

4. During 1908 came the Young Turk revolution, which placed a new sultan on the throne, and proclaimed equality of all nationalities in the Empire. By this act the Turks once again frustrated the Anglo-Russian intervention for the introduction of an autonomous government in Macedonia, which had been decided upon at the meeting of King Edward VII and Nicholas II at Reval earlier in 1908. But within a year it already became

clear to all nationalities in Macedonia that they were to receive nothing tangible. (The Arabs, Greeks, Armenians, Albanians, Rumanians, and Bulgarians were also dissatisfied in Turkey.) The state authorities undertook to disarm the Macedonian Bulgarians in 1910. The *IMRO* began its revolutionary work anew.

5. In 1912 the Balkan states fought against Turkey. The cadres of the *IMRO* placed themselves at the service of the Balkan states in order to facilitate their military operations. Immediately upon the termination of the war against Turkey, the Balkan allied states fought among themselves. Macedonia was now partitioned into three parts. The majority of the Macedonian Bulgarians fell under the rule of Greece and Serbia and were immediately subjected to denationalization.

6. From 1913 to 1915 the revolutionary struggle in Macedonia continued against Greece, but it was far more concentrated against the Serbian regime. United in this resistance in Macedonia were Bulgarians, Turks, and Albanians. In several places small uprisings occurred against the Serbian authorities.

7. From 1915 to 1918 Macedonia was occupied by the Bulgarian army. The battle front on which the Bulgarian, Turkish, Austrian, and German troops were ranged against the armies of the Entente stretched from the eastern borders of Macedonia as far as Albania. The Bulgarian and Turkish population was mobilized into the Bulgarian and Turkish armies, while the Greek population was partly in the Greek army and partly left under Bulgarian jurisdiction.

8. After the first World War the Macedonians, demobilized from the various armies, returned to their homes. The Serbo-Greek regimes continued unchanged. The revolutionary struggle continued. Participating in the struggle were fighters of Turkish, Albanian, and, to a certain extent, Rumanian nationality. Legal action was absolutely forbidden. All who attempted to

carry it out were forced to become illegal workers. The dissatisfaction, the protests of Macedonia, and her resistance continued until the outbreak of the second World War, when Bulgaria again occupied a considerable part of Macedonia.

9. At the end of the second World War, Macedonia found itself once more partitioned into three parts. The new situation now is that into that part which remained within the frontiers of Yugoslavia, a Bolshevik regime has been introduced. This regime has resorted to a new type of denationalization by proclaiming the Macedonian Bulgarians a separate nation—"Macedonian". Outside of this no other change has been effected. There still exist the same oppression and injustices as there were during the Serbian regime.

The Macedonian question again remained unsettled as it was left unsettled after the Balkan Wars. In addition, now there are some new features added which tend to make it far more intricate.

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It is not a rare phenomenon for redeeming ideas to be placed in a false light, mocked at, and even rejected. The hindrances caused by distortions and outright lies were constantly haunting the Macedonian movement. All of those who aimed at the subjugation of Macedonia were constantly setting in motion some sort of fiction. Foremost in this respect is the Serbian literature, which, in connection with Macedonia, is nothing more than a collection of utter falsifications. After that, comes the Greek propaganda, and for the past thirty years has been added that of the Balkan Bolsheviks. They all pursue the course of pouring out lies in such great profusion that, in the long run, something might always be taken as truth. Their first reliance has been upon the tact that the Macedonian movement is poor and, therefore, it would not be able to answer propaganda of this caliber. With money lavishly spent to spread misinformation, Macedonia's

enemies have been endeavoring to put into a bad light everything which the Macedonians have gained in the eyes of the world by their courage and loyalty to the ideal of liberty.

This propaganda has also relied upon the circumstance that the average citizen in almost every country knows, generally speaking, very little about the real conditions in distant countries, and is, therefore, readily inclined to believe all that the press prints for him. Besides, it is much easier to spread misinformation about struggles of a quite lasting character. Such is the case with the Macedonian struggle. During the earlier period of its appearance, the western world showed great sympathy toward it. But when diplomacy protracted endlessly the settlement of the Macedonian question, parallel with this sympathy there gradually appeared in certain circles of the public a peculiar vexation. There are people who are really getting tired of constantly hearing about the existence of struggles, even though they might be ultra fond of liberty.

Serbia and Greece, as we have explained, have been constantly aiming at the division of the Macedonian lands. Therefore, the movement which strives to insure the unity and independence of Macedonia, from their standpoint, ought to be discredited, and, above all, destroyed. While on principle Bulgaria had agreed with the idea of independence for Macedonia and had tolerated the independence of the Macedonian movement, she has not always shown consistency in that direction. And because of that, the Macedonian movement has quite often involved itself in conflict with the Bulgarian governments, or other circles which persisted in slandering the Macedonian organizations.

Bolshevik Russia figured that the high-sounding name and the dynamics of the Macedonian movement could have helped her for her political and revolutionary aims in the Balkans. She, therefore, undertook to capture it or, failing that, to eliminate it from her path. Since she met resistance there, communist Russia

ordered her subservient agents all over the world to slander, as much as possible, the Macedonian organizations. When we take under consideration the extent to which the western world was involved in its own post-war problem; how its political atmosphere had changed and was endangering existing freedom; how the voices of different authoritative and liberty-loving representatives of public opinion were suppressed, in order to subjugate them gradually to a regimented state policy; how the obstacles for visiting a struggling country like Macedonia were increased—it is explainable, therefore, why on the propaganda front the Macedonian movement could not compete with its adversaries, and had to bear the brunt of her enemies' attacks. More particularly so, since it had no one of the great Powers on its side, while Serbia and Greece have been able to find encouragement, either secretly or openly, from some of the Powers of the post-Versailles political system, and Bolshevik Russia stands behind the Balkan communists.

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It is useless for us to dwell further upon the distortions of the truth about which we have given explanations above. We have said that the movement grew up independently. We pointed out that it was fighting for autonomy while under the Turkish regime and for independence after the Balkan wars, despite the Serbo-Greek attempted confutations of these truths. It is a fact that no Serbians or Greeks ever fought for the ideal of Macedonian autonomy or independence, but the Macedonian movement has always worked only for that ideal. It is unnecessary to dwell anew on the ridiculous denial of the Bulgarian nationality and also on the fiction of some sort of a "Macedonian" nationality, of which, until the present, no one has ever heard. Bolshevik policy invents new nations or denies the old ones, according to the dictation of her secret intentions. In Germany there are spoken dialects which are difficult to be understood by the Germans of other German districts, but the Bolshevik policy there appears today as the champion of the German state and national unity.

The Bulgarians from the delta of the Danube all the way down to Epirus speak one language, but Bolshevik Russia wants to introduce national dissidence among them, in spite of the fact that, on the basis of the nationality principle, Czarist Russia logically calculated to include all Bulgarians into one state.

We have mentioned elsewhere that another product of interested propaganda is the "apprehension" that Macedonia, by economic considerations, could not exist separately. Then, too, there has been set forth by Bolshevik sources that the Macedonian question has already been settled. Similar assurances were given to the world by Serbia and Greece since the early days of their domination in Macedonia. It is also spread abroad that the Macedonian movement has been working for disunity of the Balkan peoples. . . . The aim of the movement has been distorted. But its aim is clear and specific. It stands for a free and independent Macedonia.

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Speculations are being made about the illegal method of the Macedonian struggle. We have explained that this method is a product of the regimes themselves. Nevertheless, attempts are made by the enemies to depict the Macdonian fighters as professional rebels. To follow this logic, then we would have to consider the Irish people, as a whole, to be composed of professional agitators or rebels, since their struggle for independence has lasted for centuries. The causes which gave the foundation to the *IMRO* for its illegal struggle, particularly against the Serbian and Greek regimes, are far greater than those which caused the series of revolutions in the past and recently in the western world. It would be a real sacrilege for one to think that the Macedonian fighters are sacrificing themselves for anything less than liberty, people's government, peace, national existence, creativeness, and progress. In the civilized world people call strikes for higher wages. Debates and fights are carried on against any violation or

infringement upon their right to vote. Quite often, in connection with certain social problems, they resort to armed struggles.

The Macedonians are enduring a ceaseless economic, physical, and political yoke, and an unchanged terroristic regime. If one were looking for slaves in Europe, they could be found in Macedonia. The existing regime wants to make them slaves. Since the people there are not slaves, by feeling, by consciousness, or by mentality, they readily resort to an illegal armed struggle. We are inclined to believe that, should there be an attempt to deny the national name, language, and consciousness of Americans, Englishmen, Russians, Germans, or others, they too would rise as one man with arms in hand.

The Macedonian Bulgarians have been able to keep their national existence before the eyes of the world through their illegal struggle. Their enemies strongly wish to have them remain as peaceful as sheep, in order to silence them, and in due course of time cause the question of Macedonia and the Bulgarian nationality there to disappear. The well-known popular French writer, Albert Lantoine, in connection with the Macedonian struggle, wrote:

"When the oppressors are alien to every sense of justice, conspiracy becomes a duty. Against injustices the illegal weapon is permissible".[23]

While still under the Turkish regime, when the Macedonians still enjoyed books and newspapers in their own language, and maintained their schools, churches, and cultural societies, the outside world deemed their illegal struggles justifiable. Is it not unjustifiable to maintain now, while they are being terrorized and slaughtered, that they have no right to act with arms? Since they are convinced that their happy future lies only in the creation of an independent Macedonian state, have they not the right

23. See Albert Lantoine's book, *Abdication du Selle,* Paris, 1923.

to fight for it by illegal methods, since they are not permitted to carry on their fight in a legal way? When the Americans were convinced that they must attain their own independent status, they also took up arms against their brother Englishmen. They would doubtlessly have resorted to armed resistance much sooner had the American colonies not been under the British but under some alien domination.

The *IMRO* had as its fundamental principle to prosecute only the guilty officials of the regime. During the period of the insurrection of 1903, the *IMRO* publicly proclaimed the protection of the peaceful Turks and Mohammedan population. In a similar situation, for example, the behavior of the Greeks had been entirely different. In 1821, after they learned that their influential fellow-countryman, Ypsilanti, had already entered Moldavia (Rumania) and that Russian help was a probability, the Greeks of Peloponnesus revolted and in one week slaughtered 15,000 Turks. In this case, of course, it was the Turkish population which suffered, and not the Turkish army. Inasmuch as there have been some accusations made that during some of the wars there occurred acts contrary to the principles and regulations of the *IMRO* (that is, not to enroach upon the peaceful population) the blame should not be thrown on the *IMRO,* but on private individuals who were acting as mobilized organs of the military authorities, or were even directly in the service of foreign military authorities.

Revenge has never been a policy of the *IMRO.* In the promulgation of its revolutionary measures and acts, the *IMRO* always made the necessary effort to avoid the occurrence of unnecessary sacrifices, or, when they became inevitable, to reduce the number to a minimum. Characteristic of its attitude and policy was the *IMRO's* behavior during the second World War, when, after twenty-three years of Serbo-Greek bondage of Macedonia, the *IMRO* did not permit its members to carry out revenge against the Serbians and Greeks there, who were defeated and could have

been placed in disfavor, and at the mercy of the Macedonian Bulgarians, should the latter have wished it.

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There were also internal frictions in the Macedonian movement. There was, however, no ground for depicting as internal struggles those which it was conducting against foreign political schemes even if they were originated by the Bulgarian state. It might seem that the attempt of a group of individuals with leftist inclinations to enact a split after 1903 in one of the revolutionary districts was an internal quarrel. But even in this case, it was an obvious attempt of intervention on the part of foreign parties in the affairs of Macedonia. The disputes which arose during 1928 would also appear to be an internal quarrel. But even then it was an attempt of foreign provocation. The individuals who were expelled from the ranks of the Macedonian movement dropped their masks and openly enlisted in the service of the Bolsheviks and other foreign circles with anti-Macedonian frame of mind.

Every revolutionary movement, like every political party, takes necessary measures and imposes sanctions against its inquitous members. In similar instances in the Macedonian movement, the subjugators of Macedonia were quick with their imagination and accusation that the Macedonian movement was self-exterminating and so on. In order to explain the groundlessness of these anti-Macedonian propagandas, nearly identical instances could be found in the history of almost every European nation. There is no European country or nation which has not gone through some sort of domestic or internal quarrels. Of ordinary occurrence were even the major splits of the political parties of the world. Internal disturbances have occurred in almost every revolutionary movement. Take, for example, the renowned quarrels in the French revolution. Every one of the most popular leaders of the different political currents and thousands of their

followers, one after the other, went to the guillotine. Dangerous internal struggles appeared among the Irish revolutionists. In Switzerland, also, as we have noted elsewhere, there occurred many disputes and fights of social, political, and religious nature. The development of the different nations was accompanied by disputes and struggles. No one is in a position to point out a single nation in which no struggle of any kind ever occurred. It is needless, on the whole, to do more than enumerate a few instances which are well engraved in the minds of every high school student. Let us take for example, the struggles among the Englishmen at the time of Cromwell, the religious wars among the German people, or the civil struggle in Spain.

But let us leave these precedents with the countries distant from Macedonia. The Greek and Serbian liberation movements in the beginning of the nineteenth century had their displays of great contradictions which eventually led to bloody struggles. Greek leaders exterminated each other. It is a known fact that no other nation in Europe is so much inclined toward factionalism, internal revolts, and persecutions, as are the Greeks. In Serbia, as a result of internal factional quarrels, their most renowned national hero—Serbia's emancipator from the Turkish yoke—Karageorge, was butchered by the Serbians themselves.

Considering recent times, we can point out what occurred in the struggles of Serbs and Greeks during the World War, when they revolted against the German invaders of their fatherlands. The Greeks split into factions and threw themselves into a mutual civil struggle which has taken the lives of as many, if not even more, of their fellow-countrymen as were lost in the resistance against the invaders. What occurred among the Serbians is even more tragic. All domestic controversies, all the victims of internal strife in the Macedonian movement ever since it came into existence, if added together would be only child's play in comparison with the destruction of property and lives of its victims, which the Serbians have perpetrated in their fratricidal

struggles in the course of two to three years during the second World War.

Sometimes in their propaganda the Russian Bolsheviks even refer to instances of disputes in the ranks of the Macedonians, utterly disregarding what has occurred and is still taking place in their own ranks. No one will ever know, of course, the number of Bolsheviks and, more particularly, non-Bolshevik Russians who have disappeared without leaving any trace. We do know however, about the slaughtering of the entire old Bolshevik guard, which consisted of world-known communists like Leon Trotsky, George Zinoviev, Bukharin, Kamenev, Tuhachevsky, and many others. Similar purges—though not so noisily executed—are also taking place within other Bolshevik parties of the world.

If the Maecdonian revolutionary movement had had at its disposal its own jails, it could have been able to abolish capital punishment, at least of the guilty ones at home. Complete exclusion of punishment is almost impossible in any organization which is forced to fight against some of its own members, or against regimes who are aiming to denationalize and exterminate its nation.

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"But in Macedonia there is and there always will be fights between its constituent nationalities" has been a constant retort. The tendency, of course, is to present Macedonia as a synonym for disorders, or to imply that as a whole her struggles are some sort of thoughtless scramble. When they are not the product of hostile propaganda, such opinions are the result of lack of knowledge of the facts. The struggles between the Greek and the Bulgarian nationalities of Macedonia are remnants of the age-old struggle between Byzantium and Bulgaria, and also of the attempts by the Greek clergy to denationalize the Bulgarians. Ever since the creation of the independent Bulgarian Church, when the Greek clergy no longer ruled over the dioceses of the Bulgarian land,

the totality of the Greco-Bulgarian struggle on a national basis has ceased.

With the creation of an independent Macedonian state, her Bulgarian and Greek populations would live fraternally and through their common efforts would build their own prosperity. An end would then be put to the rivalry between the Greek and the Bulgarian states, which is no longer a struggle for Balkan supremacy, as it was at the time of Byzantium. In other words, the quarrels between Greeks and Bulgarians have lost much of their old strain and acuteness. Concrete possibilities are present for the reign of Greco-Bulgarian harmony. How sensible and very symbolic it would be to bury and put a cross upon the centuries-old struggle there, which had reached its apex almost a thousand years ago, with the blinding in Macedonia of the 15,000 Bulgarian prisoners.

Once the present Greco-Bulgarian disputes are settled, one might predict that there would be no other national conflicts between them. On a national basis, there are no quarrels between Bulgarians and Turks. The same is true between the Turks and Greeks. Inasmuch as there might be some friction between the Albanians and Greeks in the southern part of the country, and in other places with the Bulgarians, these disputes are of minor importance and would not endanger the unification or the existence of an independent Macedonia. The presence of antagonism on a national basis is primarily due to the unsettled political situation, and also to the absence of freedom in the country. Should these conditions be changed, national vexations would disappear, and foreign interference would disappear or, at least, be reduced to a minimum. In modern times, Macedonia has never been an independent country, so her government, or her internal policy, cannot be considered guilty for the existing disappointments there. One will be able to judge Macedonia's ability to organize and govern herself only when she becomes free and independent. Then there will be no foreign governing power in Macedonia to

falsify facts or to suppress the national language and consciousness.

There have been struggles between separate nationalities or separate provinces in many lands which today constitute free and independent states. Let us recall here the disputes in Belgium, where the Flemish people constituting half of Belgium's population, for decades after the creation and recognition of the Belgian state, fought for the equality and official recognition of their language. Because of these disagreements, no one has ever dared to maintain that it was useless and unnecessary to create an independent Belgian state. Even Switzerland had its conflicts. But there, too, like Belgium, they quickly evaporated once these countries were recognized as independent. They received international guarantee of their territorial integrity and respect for their neutrality. Let the same thing be done for Macedonia, and then shall one see whether or not she would serve as an example for understanding and brotherly rapprochement of the Balkan peoples!

If Macedonia receives just settlement and becomes a free country, there would be no particular reason for big party divisions. The allegations that the people there would constantly be at loggerheads with each other are absolutely superficial and originate only from Macedonia's enemies. Proof of such things has never been established there, even during the time of their bondage which was coupled with foreign intrigues, economic misery, and moral oppression. The *IMRO* represented a solid block of a unified physical and spiritual national power. During the period of the Turkish "Huriet", 1908 to 1910, all the nationalities were solidly organized in their Constitutional Clubs. They elected their representatives, and demonstrated that they, too, could lead a peaceful social life. For the past half century, almost without disturbance, the Macedonian legal organizations continued to develop their charitable, cultural, and political activities. During the Turkish regime, the Bulgarian population

unanimously obeyed and followed its own spiritual leadership—church, national, and cultural associations—which, to a certain extent, served as courts of justice. Self-disciplined trade associations existed in Macedonia for centuries. One can say that in Macedonia there were fewer political divisions on social-political bases than there were in a number of free and democratic European states, and this, in spite of the fact that the Macedonian people were being oppressed by heavy bondage. Since political violences have become more frequent in Europe, since political freedom there has declined, and since the friction of powerful factors has become more acute, one can see, then, that even Europe has become "Balkanized".

Give Macedonia an era of justice. Let the political oppression there cease. Then, the last remnants of misunderstandings, which have been so greatly exaggerated and badly interpreted abroad, shall disappear.

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As a résumé of what has been said in this chapter, the following facts may be established:

1. Macedonia carries on a ponderous struggle for its emancipation.

2. The idea of independence has originated from within the Macedonians themselves.

3. The intervention of the European Powers in behalf of Macedonian independence is tardy.

How similar to the case of Switzerland has been Macedonia's plight!

Chapter V

Attempts For the Political Resuscitation of Macedonia

THE IDEA for the political resuscitation of Macedonia did not remain only in the programs and the recommendations of the Macedonian organizations. Because of the salient features outlined in it, her cause attained such great popularity that in some instances even those who were least pleased were unable to by-pass her entirely. The Serbian statesmen also commenced to talk about Macedonia.

1. In 1904 negotiations for rapprochement between Bulgaria and Serbia commenced. The chief Serbian statesman at that time, Nicola Pashich, announced before the Bulgarian delegates that he was ready to enter negotiations for an agreement of which the basis would be the autonomy of Macedonia. At that time was concluded a tariff treaty between the two countries.

2. During 1909 the question of their rapprochement was raised anew. Before the Bulgarian minister plenipotentiary, A. Tosheff, the Serbian prime minister, Milovanovich, announced

that even the Serbians could accept the Bulgarian position for Macedonian autonomy.[24]

3. During 1907 the Greek statesman Zaimis expressed himself also for autonomous Macedonia but with spheres of influence.[25]

4. In 1912, at the formation of the Balkan Alliance, the Serbians again expressed their readiness to act for Macedonian autonomy. This was confirmed also by Iv. E. Gueshoff, Bulgarian prime minister.[26] But even then it was quite obvious that both countries—Serbia and Bulgaria—were taking a roundabout way for the eventual decision for autonomy.

5. The fourth member of the Balkan League, Montenegro, was completely in accord with the idea of Macedonian autonomy. King Nikita unfolded before the Bulgarian minister plenipotentiary, A. Tosheff, arguments for the benefit to be derived from it. These points were identical with those of the *IMRO*.

6. In the defensive treaty of May 18, 1912, concluded between Bulgaria and Greece, there were provided for the population in Macedonia guarantees for the rights "flowing out from the treaties". By this was understood Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty, which dealt with the introduction of reforms in Macedonia leading to autonomy.

7. The projected note, which was to be presented to Turkey by the Balkan Allies before the outbreak of the Balkan war, was carefully prepared by them with an attractive text in order to win over the world's public opinion, and also to give Austria

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24. On this question details may be found in A. Tosheff's book, *The Balkan Wars,* Part I.

25. Tosheff, A., *The Balkan Wars,* Part I, pp. 168-169.

26. Gueshoff, Iv. E., *The Balkan League,* p. 15. Gueshoff was the leader of the National party in Bulgaria and prime minister during the war of the Balkan Alliance against Turkey.

and Rumania no reason for intervening in behalf of Turkey. They had agreed that it was absolutely necessary to ask for the autonomy of Macedonia. On this subject there is ample data in the work of Balkan statesmen.[27]

In the projected agreement between Bulgaria and Serbia for the declaration of war on Turkey, the four Allied Balkan states with identical notes, or with a collective one, were to demand from Turkey the application of the reforms foreseen by the Berlin Treaty: (a) the appointment of a governor-general from a neutral country, approved by the Great Powers; (b) the election of provincial councils; (c) the establishment of a local gendarmerie; (d) the introduction of the reforms was to be under the control of the ambassadors of the Great Powers and the ministers of the four Balkan states.

These demands represented a most important step toward autonomy. It is quite obvious, too, that not only the Macedonian workers, but also the Balkan states considered that control by the Great Powers was necessary. From that, to the guarantee of the Great Powers was only a step. On principle, therefore, there was under consideration for Macedonia a situation very similar to what Switzerland had formerly experienced. In the name of the Balkan League, Bulgaria presented the note of October 12, 1912, to Turkey. The first demand in this note was the ethnic autonomy of the nationalities. The Bulgarians predominated in Macedonia. They had their own schools, churches, cultural and social institutions. It followed that all neighboring states of Macedonia on this occasion formally recognized the Bulgarian nationality in Macedonia, and also recognized the Greek and other native nationalities. In a special point, the note demanded the recognition of all types of schools of the Christians, in line with the Ottoman school. It further asked that the Sublime Porte

27. On this question details are found in A. Tosheff's book, *The Balkan Wars*. There can be found also information about the position of the Montenegrin King Nikita relative to Macedonian autonomy.

pledge itself not to change the national character of the provinces of the Ottoman Empire by new settlements there of Mussulman population.

In the Serbian project of the ultimatum, which was to be presented to Turkey (a copy of which was also given officially to the Bulgarian minister to Belgrade, A. Tosheff), Point One states:

"The Porte is to proceed immediately toward the application of the reforms foreseen by Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty, basing them on the principle of the ethnic autonomy of the nationalities in European Turkey (autonomous provinces, governors-general from some neutral country, Swiss or Belgian; elective provincial councils; local gendarmerie; financial self-management; national army, etc.)"

Point Two states:

"The ambassadors of the Great Powers and the ministers-plenipotentiary of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Monenegro to control the introduction of these reforms."

8. After the defeat of the Turkish army in 1912, Turkish delegates appeared who proposed the autonomy of Macedonia, but the proposal was rejected.

9. After the breakdown of the Balkan Alliance and after the inter-allied war, Turkey and Bulgaria entered negotiations for rapprochement, and reverted to the idea for the autonomy of Macedonia.

10. Before the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the Bulgarian delegation made the following official proposal:

"The Bulgarian character of Macedonia is established

through series of testimonials and documents. . . . The Great Powers, in solemn acts and documents, issued by their chancelleries, proclaimed that Macedonia is Bulgarian, in harmony with noble principles, announced by the chief Allied Powers. The Bulgarian delegation would have, therefore, reasons to ask the annexation of that province to the Bulgarian Kingdom. However, it could not fail to take under consideration the obstacles of political nature which such a settlement would meet, however justifiable it may be from the standpoint of ideal considerations. Thus, deeply imbued by the idea that the Macedonian question could be settled today by a method simultaneously practical and just—simply through a formula which would give to the population of the country a regime guaranteeing their freedom and national life; to the Balkan states, a method for pacification; while to the Great Powers, a factor for stability and order—the Bulgarian delegation has the honor to propose to the Conference that Macedonia be raised, in her geographic boundaries, into an independent state, and placed under the control of the chief Allied and associated Powers or under one of those among them which the Conference would designate."[28]

Here we see again the idea for international control and guarantee as the solution of the Macedonian question. At the head of the Bulgarian delegation which handed in the above declaration were Todor Todoroff, leader of the National party, and Alexander Stambolisky, leader of the Peasant party. Although they also expressed themselves for the rapprochement of the southern Slavs, the above-quoted document unambiguously points out what was their conception for the solution of the Macedonian question and for the nationality of the Macedonian Slavs. Most of the political parties in Bulgaria entertained a similar understanding of the Macedonian question. To every one of them the Bulgarian kinship of the Macedonian Slavs is clear.

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28. Notes of the Bulgarian Delegation on the Project of the Treaty of Peace, Paris-Neuilly, Sept. 19, 1919, pp. 33-34.

11. We have by no means exhausted all the occasions when the Balkan governments or their officials expressed themselves in behalf of Macedonian autonomy. The examples given are enough for everyone to be convinced that, even according to the Balkan states, the resuscitation of Macedonia is not only possible, but also desirable. The attempt of the Bolsheviks to create in Yugoslavia a separate "Macedonian" federal unit confirms the fact that the aim of the Macedonian population is toward political revival. The accorded status for Macedonia in Bolshevik Yugoslavia is, however, only on paper. Actually, full national autonomy is not permitted. Moreover, there has been introduced a regime of denationalization similar to that which existed during the time of King Alexander's Yugoslavia.

We shall now enumerate several of the more significant instances when some of the Great Powers were deliberating upon, or were anticipating, the introduction of autonomy in Macedonia:

1. In 1876 the six Great Powers, namely, England, France, Russia, Italy, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, had their representatives meet at a conference in Constantinople with plenipotentiaries of Turkey. The purpose was to deliberate and propose measures for the reformation and organization of the Turkish provinces in Europe. This Conference came after the Bulgarian uprising in Thrace and Danubian Bulgaria.

The French delegate presented three plans: (a) how Bulgaria should be organized within the boundary limits of the Ottoman empire. This plan did not speak separately for Macedonia but considered her as part of Bulgaria, (b) a plan for terms of peace to settle the existing war between Serbia and Turkey, (c) a plan for the organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Conference decided that the Bulgarian lands must be organized into two large autonomous provinces. The Eastern Province was to have Turnovo as its capital. The Western Prov-

ince, which included mainly the Macedonian lands, was to have Sofia as its capital. The Western Province included also the district along the Morava River, which contained the cities of Vrania, Pirot, Nish, and others.

Had this plan been realized, autonomy within the Turkish frontiers would have attained long ago a solid foundation for the cultural and economic improvement of the Macedonian population. After that no one could have denied the Bulgarian characacter of Macedonian Slavs. Furthermore, the wars against Turkey and those between the Balkan states would have been avoided.

2. In connection with the conclusion of the Berlin Treaty, 1878, Russia made an attempt to win over Austria-Hungary to support autonomy for Macedonia and Albania. Austria did not agree.

3. The Berlin Congress decided that Turkey should introduce reforms in Macedonia. The decision was contained in Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty. The Great Powers were to have undertaken the responsibility for its execution. If these recommended measures had been applied, autonomy would have been gradually achieved.

4. After the Gorno-Djumaya rising of 1902 in eastern Macedonia, the Great Powers recommended certain reforms to Turkey. But in reality only the right of the Christian village watchmen to carry arms was granted. Even though some of the Great Powers were advocating autonomous reforms, the only result was the reformation of the village watchmen!

5. After the Ilinden insurrection of 1903, a meeting between the Russian Czar Nicholas II and Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria-Hungary took place in Murzsteg. There they worked out the main points for reforms which were proposed to Turkey. She accepted them on November 25 of the same year. Again

Macedonia received nothing. The Great Powers sent instructors to the various vilayets (provinces) of European Turkey in order to reorganize the Turkish gendarmerie. Hopes for Macedonian autonomy were again postponed!

6. Italy, through her statesman Titoni, stated her position in 1907 in behalf of an autonomous Macedonia. Titoni declared in the Parliament:

"The Macedonian question must be solved through an autonomous government on a nationality-principle."

7. During 1908, King Edward VII of England and Nicholas II of Russia met at Reval. An agreement was reached between these two Great Powers which was to bring about the realization of autonomy. The British foreign minister, Edward Gray, announced in the House of Commons that England had taken the initiative in favor of the appointment of a governor-general for Macedonia.

In Turkey, meanwhile, a military revolution took place. It was announced that the Sultan had introduced into the country a modern Constitution, which granted liberty and equality to all nationalities and to all of his subjects. By this move Turkey managed to frustrate the introduction of autonomy in Macedonia. An identical farce was staged in 1876 when a Constitution was proclaimed, and broad rights were promised for the nationalities in Turkey, in order to frustrate the application of the decision which had been arrived at by the six Great Powers at their Constantinople Conference. Whether or not in 1876, as well as in 1908, some of the Great Powers were secretly acting, as it was suspected, to bring about the collapse of these reedeeming plans is of no significance for us here. We have established that, when the aim was the pacification of the Balkans and the appeasement of Macedonia, even the Great Powers could recommend only Macedonian autonomy.

8. During October of 1912, the Russian representative in Sofia, Nekludoff, wrote to the minister of foreign affairs in St. Petersburg that the best way of solving the difficulties in European Turkey was for Albania and Macedonia to be autonomous and placed under the protection of the Great Powers. And while the war against Turkey was still going on, Russian official factors had again suggested the idea for autonomy. Unfortunately, by that time the Balkan Allies had already abandoned that idea.[29]

9. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, there was laid before the Great Powers the question for the resuscitation of Yugoslav Macedonia as an autonomous province within the frontiers of Yugoslavia. The Italian delegation presented its own plan. The British presented another one which was supported by the American and Japanese delegations. Both of these proposals failed primarily because of the opposition by the French representatives, who supported Serbia's uncompromising attitude.

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The *IMRO* has often warned that if the idea for the autonomy were abandoned and the division of Macedonia were allowed, wars between the Balkan nations and an everlasting hatred would be inevitable. The events during the past thirty-five years have confirmed this evaluation by the *IMRO* with more facts than ever expected.

We have seen that the word "autonomy", instead of being expressly underscored as the war aim in the Balkan Treaty of Alliance, was hardly mentioned, and then in a way which could immediately be sensed as evasive. In the agreement between Bulgaria and Serbia was stated that Macedonia would be divided between the two contracting parties, "if both countries are convinced that the organization of that territory into a particular

29. Tosheff, A., *The Balkan Wars,* Part II, p. 81.

autonomous province is impossible from the point of view of the common interests of the Bulgarian and Serbian nations, or for other internal or external reason."

Obviously, both countries had decided in advance upon the division of Macedonia. That is why they did not wait any longer to be "convinced", but as soon as their troops—especially the Serbians—advanced in Macedonia, they began to treat her as part of their own lands. Despite the fact that the Treaty contained such ambiguous words about autonomy, the lines of division of Macedonia were carefully designated by the above treaty! As far as the actual common interests of the Serbians and the Bulgarians were concerned, they should have insisted upon the autonomy of Macedonia. It was dictated also by every "internal and external reason". One may recall that we pointed out previously that the Balkan governments themselves, in their collective note to Turkey, formulated important arguments for the autonomy.

Immediately preceding the Balkan War, it depended almost entirely upon the Balkan governments, above all that of Bulgaria and Serbia, to state what were to be the war aims. During the formation of their Alliance, the Bulgarian representatives—Stancheff and Rizoff—presented on November 7, 1911, to the Serbian prime minister, Milovanovich, the following note:

"If after the war to be undertaken together by Serbia and Bulgaria, it is found that a necessary condition for its termination is an autonomous government for the provinces populated by Bulgarians and Serbians, both countries shall agree to conclude peace by guaranteeing autonomy for the said provinces."[30]

Which means simply that these two countries (and no one else) were to decide whether or not it would be necessary for the

30. On this subject more data could be found in the works of the Bulgarian political writers, Dr. Alexander Girginoff, K. Solaroff, and P. Todoroff. But more detailed information may be found in A. Tosheff, *The Balkan Wars*, Vol. I & II.

war to terminate with autonomy. The provinces which are referred to above are Macedonia, inhabited by Bulgarians, and the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar, inhabited by Serbians.

Bulgaria should have asked for greater clarification of the war aims in her understanding with Greece. What was mentioned in the agreement—"aiming to assure the rights flowing from the treaties"—was quite near to the idea of autonomy. It contained nothing which dealt with the partition of Macedonian lands.

It is quite clear now that the contents of the concluded treaties and agreements between them, also the joint note addressed to Turkey, were entirely at variance with the secret designs of the Balkan Allies. The aspiration for the liberation of their subjugated Christian brothers was crowded out by another more powerful longing—that of conquest of territory. In the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of Alliance the craving for territorial acquisition was strongly indicated, especially the Serbian desire to conquer almost all of Albania. The aim for the subjugation of the Albanians certainly cast a shadow of real doubt upon all the liberation motives of that war. Serbia should have been completely satisfied with the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar and Kossovo, and also with a corridor-outlet to the Adriatic Sea, which Pashich, the outstanding Serbian political leader, had promised to Austria through Professor T. Masarik, who at that time was a deputy in the Austrian Reichstag.[31]

The Greek government was also unsympathetically disposed

31. In Graf Sforza's book, *Pashich and the Unity of the Slavs,* is stated on pp. 108-109, that Pashich, through T. Masarik, then a member of the Austrian Reichstag, had informed the Vienna government about some of his proposals at the end of 1912. Masarik confided some of Pashich's proposals to W. Steed, the Vienna correspondent of the London *Times.* In Pashich's proposal was stated: "Though we are favorably disposed for the division of Albania, we could accept the Austrian idea for an autonomous Albania, as proof that we are ready to respect the wishes of Austria." Further on it states: "We want from Austria a seaport and a corridor to lead to that port."

toward the idea of Macedonian autonomy. The Turks for decades constantly postponed its introduction.

The Bulgarian official policy evoked condemnation, not only by the subjugated Bulgarian people, but also by the free ones. Bulgaria should have accepted the proposals of the militarily defeated Turks, especially since her Allies at that time had already begun to show their cards by resolving not to evacuate the territories occupied by them. Bulgaria should have taken a firm stand by insisting upon the contents of the joint note to Turkey which asked for autonomy. In time of need she could have appealed to the Great Powers and world public opinion, by announcing that she was waging war for liberation and not for annexation of territories. Such a move on the part of Bulgaria would have met with approval everywhere. Serbia and Greece could have been forced to accept the idea of autonomy for Macedonia. The Bulgarian victory over the Turks at Lule-Burgas had raised, as never before, the prestige of Bulgaria and her army. After such a brilliant victory and the clear Bulgarian national right in Macedonia, a moderate Bulgarian policy would have increased her prestige still more. But instead of that, the responsible factors in Bulgaria ordered their subordinates not to say a word further about the autonomy of Macedonia.

The subjugated Macedonian Bulgarians are grateful to their brothers in free Bulgaria who, upon several occasions, shed their blood on the battle fields with the desire to help their brothers in Macedonia. Both the Macedonian Bulgarians and also the people of free Bulgaria condemn and can never forgive those Bulgarian politicians who, several times in succession, gambled with the chances of Macedonia's autonomy. They pushed Macedonia under new bondage with great risks to Bulgaria herself. The politicians seemed unable to profit for previous successive failures. However, they never forgot the enormous value of the idea of autonomy. They mentioned that idea often, but they always did it after they had experienced catastrophe in their politi-

cal and military adventures. They conducted themselves in this manner after they had lost the gains from the Balkan War. They behaved in this manner in 1919, when, after their game was lost in the first World War, they hastened to give at the Paris Peace Conference the famous proposal for an independent Macedonia. It never occurred to their minds, during the arduous negotiations with the Entente Powers before they embarked the country in the first World War, to ask for the autonomy of Macedonia. They conducted themselves along the same tragicomic lines even at the end of the second World War. Then it occurred to many responsible Bulgarian politicos to ask for autonomy or the independence of Macedonia.

As judged from the information published in the Bulgarian press at the end of the second World War, even responsible Serbian individuals were reminding themselves about Macedonian autonomy. The Bulgarian regent, Professor Bogdan Philoff, stated in his diary that on September 4, 1944, Admiral Ivanoff, who was a liaison officer between the German command in Belgrade and the Bulgarian expeditionary corps in Serbia, came before him. The Admiral informed Philoff that Draja Michailovich, the leader of the Serbian underground movement, had made a proposal in order to get the cooperation of the Bulgarian army against the Bolsheviks, to grant the independence of Macedonia.

During the War a great deal could have been done by the Balkan states, and above all Bulgaria, to present the question for the independence of Macedonia and its successful solution which would have promoted the general welfare of all in the Balkans.

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We have said that there has been much for which to blame the Great Powers. The liberation of the Balkan states has been accomplished with the usual diplomatic intrigues. The most complex were those in connection with the Macedonian question. If

there is need for a testimony of the typical standard and value of most modern European diplomacy, it could be found in connection with Macedonia. There is hardly any better example of derision of national sufferings, egotism, shortsightedness, and intrigues.

The Great Powers agreed in 1876 to introduce in Macedonia an autonomous regime. However, no further step was made by them, even though it was already clear to them that the promised modern constitution by Turkey was a farce. In 1908, two of the most powerful and influential Great Powers—England and Russia —agreed to demand an autonomous administration of Macedonia. They soon abandoned their intention, notwithstanding the fact that the Turkish regime failed to carry out the promised and long-expected amelioration in the administration of Macedonia. Also, during 1912, there was no effort made on the part of the Great Powers to avert the Balkan disorders. They could have persistently and steadfastly recommended the acceptance of autonomy for Macedonia, which had already been demanded from the Sultan by the ultimatum of the Balkan Alliance. During the diplomatic rivalry to win over the Balkan states to their particular blocs, the Great Powers failed to propose or to make any effort to impose the autonomy of Macedonia, which could have accomplished so much for Balkan tranquillity. Even after the second World War not one of the Great Powers has ever proposed the only happy solution of the Macedonian question—the resuscitation of Macedonia into a separate political unit.

Every one of the Great Powers exerted efforts to strengthen its own political, economic, and strategic position in the Balkans. The armies of almost all of them have contended there. Flagrant arguments have been presented by some of them in order to remain there and dominate Macedonian lands. So then, one must not think that the Great Powers no longer care about the Balkans or that Macedonian autonomy is forgotten because of lack of information on the subject. The policy of some Powers in allotting Macedonian lands to their Balkan satellites has produced

bitter results in the recent past. It will, perhaps, produce far more bitter results in the future. Nowhere has there ever been a greater disregard for ethnographic and economic needs and rights. Moral justice and broad-sightedness have been absent.

There ought to be a radical change in the political methods manifested in the Balkans by the Great Powers. In the place of intrigues and selfishness, justice should prevail. The bulk of the Balkan difficulties have been products of the rivalry between the Great European states. And that is precisely so with regard to the still unsolved Macedonian question.

It is of little value to consider here the numerous actions taken by the Macedonian organizations before the League of Nations. The latter was not the least interested in the sufferings and the aspirations of the subjugated Macedonian people. Its indifferent attitude only accelerated the discontentment and the revolutionary struggle. The League of Nations was supposed to be the guarantor of the rights of the minorities. But in no instance did it ever show interest for the Bulgarian minority in Yugoslavia which was also the majority in Macedonia. Its attitude was the same toward the problems of the minorities in Greece. Majestic promises and proclamations of noble principles were poured out by the League of Nations and its protagonists. But alas, they were unable to hear the appeals of the oppressed peoples.

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It is quite clear then, when referring to the Macedonian question, that the difficulty does not lie in the relation between the Macedonian nationalities, nor in finding the means for their amelioration. The difficulty is mostly in affairs which occur outside of

Macedonia. It is rooted in the disagreements of her neighbors and the considerations of the Great Powers.

Years ago Switzerland, too, had such obstructive external forces hindering her internal unity and independence.

Chapter VI

The Goal of Macedonia: A Balkan Emulation of Switzerland

HOW WILL an independent Macedonia be in its organization? First of all she should have just as much unconditional independence as any of her neighboring states.

In its political structure, Macedonia would quickly reach that of the well-organized small European states, which never entertain the idea of provoking wars or casting their eyes upon other peoples' territory and fortunes. To be able to reach them also, in their material and cultural organization, would require of her intensive and creative work, particularly during the first twenty to thirty years.

Notwithstanding the centuries-old example of absolute guidance by the Turks, the Slavic Bulgarian mass of the people remains particularly true to and, we might say, originally bound with the consultative principle of the people's authority in managing their social and state affairs. This inherent democratic spirit is a helpful condition for the organization of the country on a sound basis.

The people's energy and thought would be directed toward

constructive work, rather than struggles. Cooperation would take the place of antagonisms. There would immediately be a guarantee for the building of Macedonia as an exemplary small state. That guarantee would primarily be in the will of the people to preserve unity, equality before the law, and to foster its direction toward progress.

The democratic organization of the country would facilitate itself also by the fact that there are no traces of privileges, titles, or big property owners. (Soon after the invasion of the country, the Turkish administration had abolished the status of all privileged Christians. The action of the *IMRO* helped to bring about the disappearance of the large landholdings.)

There is hardly a Macedonian who entertains ideas for a monarchical form of government, even though there are other people who have the opinion that, in the Balkans, stability could be retained only through a monarchical form of government.

Whether Macedonia would prefer to pattern its democracy after that of France or that of America, or whether she would entirely introduce that typified by Switzerland, would be determined by the future Macedonian constituent assembly. There are enough models for the political organization of a state. For many peoples the more delicate question has usually been not one of searching for, and discovery of, foreign theoretical examples, but of adapting whatever is more apt to be in conformity with the exact qualities and wishes of the people concerned. Self-government has always consisted in conforming with the ability and wishes of the people in a given epoch.

By the assurance of full liberty for all its comprising peoples, the cantonal system could be dispensed with in Macedonia. But if demands were presented for it, that system could readily be introduced there, notwithstanding the fact that there is no support for such a system in the tradition or the economic needs of

the country. Only eventual reasons concerning the nationalities there could call for the cantonal system of organization. Should that be the case, then a canton could be drawn from the districts in which the Greeks are in the majority. Another canton could be created for the provinces in which the Bulgarians are in the majority. One or two smaller cantons with Albanian population could be organized.

As far as the extent of cantonal self-government is concerned, it is probable that it would not be in the interest of Macedonian unity to go to the extreme with regard to the independence of the cantons. Macedonia would need a greater internal unity, rather than divisions. She should remain true to the necessity and principle which created her an independent state—the necessity of consolidation, the principle of federation. The Swiss Constitution limits the sovereignity of the cantons through the monopoly held by the Federal government of the post offices, the monetary system, collection of duties, managing the country's foreign affairs, maintaining an army, and the application of a common legal system.

Specific reasons might cause Macedonia to reserve the right for settlement in the country only to individuals who were born there or who are descendants of Macedonian parentage. Such a policy would not harm the liberality of the country. Immigration restrictions are practiced by the most free and powerful countries in the world, like the United States of America. Not so much as a measure against overpopulation, such restrictions would be imposed only for the internal stability of the young state. The emigrants from Macedonia must be given every possible legal facility and a generous time limit for return to their fatherland with the rights of regular citizens. Repatriation of the emigrants would be necessary for the advancement of the cultural and economic aspects of the country. It would also bring about a great practical contribution toward settling the Macedonian question in its entirety.

The freedom of the nationalities must inevitably be guaranteed by the constitution. Official recognition of the five languages —Bulgarian, Greek, Turkish, Albanian, and Arumanian—would be desirable. It would follow then that the schools should require the study, in addition to the mother language, of at least two of the remaining languages. These could be chosen either by the students or recommended by the parents. On this question the Swiss practice would be a valid example.

Every nationality could maintain unhindered its cultural and spiritual ties with its fellow nationals of the neighboring Balkan states and elsewhere. The nationalities could actively and symbolically preserve affiliations with their corresponding common national churches. It is expected that in Macedonia the church would be separated from the State. However, the connections with high church administrations in neighboring states should cause her no difficulties. For a number of decades the church within the frontiers of the Bulgarian state recognized as its head the Exarch, whose seat was in Constantinople, the capital of Turkey. All Catholic groups in the various countries acknowledge the supremacy of the Pope, whose seat is in Rome. We find the same situation with the Catholics of Switzerland, a circumstance which has not interfered with her internal development or her foreign relations. When the relations of the nationalities in Macedonia have been stabilized, the affairs of the church should take care of themselves.

The nationalities must unconditionally be given their schools and other social institutes which were forcibly eliminated in 1912. The constitution there should recognize the nationalities which history has acknowledged, and those which were able to carry on with their national name during the centuries-old Turkish regime. In order to insure the future tranquillity of the country, the basic law of the country must prohibit every provocation of arguments and tussles of nationality character.

The democratic cooperation of the nationalities in building

and developing the new Macedonian state must also be prescribed by the constitution and laws of the state. No nationality there should ever be permitted to dominate the others through arrogance, craftiness, or force.

The fraternization among the nationalities in Macedonia ought to be greatly facilitated through uniformity in the laws, and also in the cultural, economic, educational, judicial, and all other domains. From 1912 until the present time neither has there been identity of the laws for the whole country nor, in general, were the legislative branches of the dominating state ever inspired by love toward all local nationalities.

All citizens of the country, irrespective of their nationality, must have and enjoy equal rights and opportunities for admission to the judicial and participation in the prosecution authorities. The courts should be the guardians for the unhampered benefits and obligations derived from the basic law of the land, as well as for the enforcement and observation of the statute laws. Particular care must be taken that no administration should exercise its authority in preference to any one nationality at the expense of the remainder. An absolutely impartial, independent, and irremovable judicial and prosecution cadre would greatly contribute toward the realization of these objectives.

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With the disappearance of the nationalistic passions, an independent Macedonia could not be used as a terrain for sharp party disputes and differences. It would be a country of every opportunity. Social and economic life would continue to develop harmoniously in cooperative association. During its initial period it is more nearly probable that the stand of the political parties would be to present competitive constructive programs, rather

than programs of ideological differences and party disputes.

Since there is no special class of wealthy people, it would be very easy to introduce laws which would make economic and social oppression impossible. In general, everyone in Macedonia is rather poor because the land is not sufficiently cultivated. There is a great scope for productive and creative work. Every individual and national expectation for greater material prosperity and happiness is justifiable. Without much effort there could be attained the equitable and complete distribution of the land, which, for centuries, has been the aim of small property owners and propertyless peasants throughout the world. The unjust conditions caused by foreign occupation during the period of its domination need correction.

The problem of unemployment need not appear there for many years, because the labor of almost the entire population would be absorbed in projects that could hardly be influenced by foreign economic disturbances. And, what is more, the country would not be overpopulated for a long time. The huge majority of the people even now possess their own land and are engaged in agriculture. We cannot present exact statistics for all parts of divided Macedonia, but we are certain that the number of people engaged in agricultural work would be hardly less than 80% of the total population. The remainder are either tradesmen or merchants, and many of them have also some parcel of land. The mass of workers known in the western world as industrial proletariat does not exist in Macedonia.

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After what has been said in Chapter II, it is useless to emphasize anew that Macedonia could excellently produce all the necessities for its economic existence. Least of all would one expect Macedonia, because of economic necessity, to ask for affiliation with one of her neighboring states; as, for example, the German

deputies of the Austrian Reichstag, in their capacity of temporary National Assembly, in 1918, had to ask for the annexation of Austria to Germany. It is obvious that at present, the economic future of Macedonia is drawn in three main directions: (a) agriculture, which anticipates great improvements and promises a much greater income; (b) commerce, which has definitely resplendent prospects; (c) exploration and exploitation of the subsoil mineral wealth, which has limitless possibilities. Parallel with this, of course, some industrialization would be developed. A free Macedonia would be in a position to create prosperity at home. This would serve as a guarantee for all local and foreign capital, which would be invested in the diversified flourishing enterprises. The traditional honesty with which the Macedonian citizen and merchant are known in the commercial world will also play a great part in the country's development.

When the people themselves begin to feel the guarantee of an assured future, they will also invest their long-hidden savings in profitable projects. Such investments would help the industrialization and the complete material reorganization of the country.

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Macedonia's relations with her neighbors would be placed on a most cordial and loyal basis. She would, however, resist every form of irredentism. She would make all reasonable economic arrangements without becoming anyone's slave in that respect. She would recognize the justice that the maritime states should serve the neighboring countries in back of them on the principle of neutrality. Since all the Balkan states and also the more distant European countries have, more or less, need of the seaport of Salonica, suitable facilities could be provided to expedite their imports and exports.

There is no ground for arguments to be raised about her boundaries between Bulgaria and Serbia. Macedonia is defined

there with her own geographic boundary. On the Albanian side, her boundary is likewise defined by the high chains of the Shar-Planina, Korab, and other ranges. If, with Greece in the south, there would come up some boundary disputes, their settlement would not be difficult.

Before the talks began for Macedonian independence, the benefits of a Balkan federation were pointed out. As a happy decision for the Peninsula, the federation would also be acceptable to the Macedonian fighters. The moment she ceased to be an "apple of discord" in the Balkans, Macedonia would be willing to become a link in Balkan unity. In this respect the Macedonians have often pointed out that in the idea for the revival of their fatherland, there is contained no ambition for absolute power, no selfishness on a nationalistic basis, no hatred toward anyone of her neighbors. She fosters only a far-sighted conception for the common interest, vision for the necessity of Balkan harmony, and a concern for peace in general. By drawing closer together, the needs of the Balkan peoples could be well satisfied. But that cannot be attained by wars, nor even through the numerous treaties between them which are so often transgressed by non-fulfillment. Imbued by the great idea of solidarity and unity, the Macedonian fighters have always been ready to agree that a big part of the sovereignity of the future Macedonian state—the most essential one at that, the foreign affairs—be transferred to the common Balkan federal government, provided the remaining Balkan states would agree to do the same.

If, however, a Balkan bloc, federation, or confederation would not serve the cause of peace, freedom, and justice but would, instead, manifest an aggressive tendency, a free Macedonia would not then be in sympathy with it. Of course, none of the leaders of the Macedonian movement has ever entertained the idea to transfer Macedonia's sovereignity to any other country. We have as an example America, where none of the different free states has ever transferred its sovereignity to another state or

group of states, but every one of them has directly entered into a common federal state—the United States of America. The Balkan federation would be in reality justifiable only when the Balkan countries voluntarily accept it, being in advance freed from the guardianship and pressure which might forcibly have been imposed upon them and against which they had been fighting. The Balkan federation is a question that refers to all Balkan states. Macedonia, however, has a much more important problem of her own—the attainment of her freedom and independence, and of international guarantee for her right to exist as a separate political entity.

Taken as a whole, an independent Macedonia would have no reasons for disagreements with her neighbors. If she should receive some sort of international guarantee, she would promote harmony all around her. In her political organization and also in her position under the international law, an independent Macedonia would entirely resemble Switzerland.

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The position for independence stands higher than all other points of view in connection with Macedonia because of the fact that it is not egocentric. It is concerned just as much for her neighbors, including even those who have oppressed her, as it is for Macedonia. The Macedonian fighters have fostered a creative idea that gives breath to, and reveals perspectives for, a sick and disturbed Balkan Peninsula. The means for the transmission of that idea are at hand. The arguments for it are vital and convincing. The past and the present illustrate them abundantly, while the future points them out to everyone. Only the good will of her neighbors, and that of the more distant countries, is necessary for its realization.

The creation of an independent Macedonia would in no way offset the balance of power between the three disputing states—

Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece—which without it would be numerically almost the same. With the wars waged between them in the past, their numerical correlation has not changed much, except for the damage done to all of them. In modern times their conflicts have been primarily about Macedonia. They would not cease even in the future, for still newer reasons of political, economic, and military character would constantly be dragged forth in order to justify their pressure upon Macedonia. And yet they always forget the quantity of blood that has been shed among them in the past, the national resources that have been squandered, the destruction that was caused, without achieving anything except mutual incurment of animosity and self-exhaustion.

In the course of 750 years there have been carried on nearly eighty wars between Bulgaria and Byzantium. On the average there was a war for every ten years. Naturally, not all of these wars were on a big scale; sometimes they were only the result of partial expeditions or military demonstrations. But even in these cases national resources were invested in mutual rancors, while international grudges became more and more intensified. Only when Byzantium and Bulgaria were both under the Turkish domination were there no wars between them. Between Serbia and Bulgaria, during Serbia's short free existence in the Middle Ages, there were waged ten to fifteen wars. They were at peace only after both were conquered by the Turks.

As soon as Serbia and Byzantium became neighbors during the Middle Ages friction also developed between them. After their liberation from the Turkish yoke during the nineteenth century the three Balkan states were again at each other's throats. Within seventy years there were waged three wars between Greece and Bulgaria, and four wars between Serbia and Bulgaria. Even though the last war—the second World War—passed without any declared military action, it assumed the character of military manipulations against one another. It is obvious that the material and spiritual forces of these peoples in their short peaceful periods

were engaged only in preparation for the next war. During the course of their whole history they have been psychologically at war with one another. In the Balkan War, after a five century-old common suffering during the Turkish regime, the Balkan states found themselves allied for only two or three months, and after that they were at war with each other.

Similar history, without doubt, could be prolonged for at least a thousand more years, if an acceptable formula for peaceful and happy relations between them cannot be found. The key to this formula is an independent Macedonia. She would physically separate their countries from one another. As a general rule there have always been irritations and wars between neighboring states. It has been so in the west, and it has been so in the east. Amidst the Slavic peoples, for example, patience and friendliness have existed only between those which were not neighboring. Even thus has been the relation of the Balkan peoples, not only among themselves but in other directions. Let us take, for example, the Bulgarians and the Hungarians, who, not being neighbors today, have maintained friendly relations between them, and, at times, sentimental manifestations. But during the Middle Ages, when the Bulgarian and Hungarian states were neighboring, they were engaged in nearly twenty wars. Causes for conflict were always found. Hungary and Bulgaria also fought for hegemony, but mainly for the domination of the provinces around Belgrade.

The fundamental cause for the Balkan disorders today, as we have already stated, is their aspiration toward the conquest of the Macedonian lands. In connection with this aspiration all of the Balkan states are mutually lying in wait, even when they are formally in friendly and allied ties, such as in recent times has often been the case between Greece and Serbia. That is why the causes for such situations must be neutralized, and why Macedonia must become an independent state. The decision, however,

would be effective only if an international guarantee in some form stands behind it.

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As far as the Bulgarian nation is concerned, she accepts this decision with the consciousness that sacrifices must be made for the cause of Balkan peace and harmony. In this case Bulgaria would conduct herself according to Solomon's wise advice during the argument about the child's real mother. It is much better, indeed, for the Bulgarians of Macedonia to live free and make progress in an independent Macedonia, than for Bulgaria to continue wasting her forces in attempts for all-Bulgarian unity, so disagreeable to others, while the Macedonian Bulgarians themselves still remain in bondage.

Some are inclined to think that the attachment for their own nationality would prove for Greeks and Bulgarians much stronger than their loyalty to an independent Macedonia. That perhaps could be true if the future Macedonian state would permit national oppression. Since such oppression will be forbidden by the constitution and laws, then their love for their own nationality would dictate the sustainment of an independent Macedonia. Otherwise, it would mean the repetition of the wretched past—afflictions of quarrels, wars, and a lastingly uncertain future for all in the Balkans. In a resuscitated Macedonia there would be found a happy harmony between the two feelings—one toward their correlative nationality and the other toward their native country, Macedonia.

The Bulgarian population in Macedonia through its participation in the *IMRO* has proved that it accepts wholeheartedly the idea for an independent Macedonia. The flare of civil strife in southern Macedonia during and after the second World War indicates that the frame of mind and also the interests of the local Greek population have been interpreted entirely wrong on the part of the nationalistic centers and governments in Athens.

Amidst this population there have appeared autonomist tendencies, as well as a proneness for other political combinations entirely different from those of Greater Greece centers. While Bulgaria, Greece, and, to a certain extent, Albania would have to make sacrifices in Solomon's spirit, there are other Balkan states which need make no sacrifices for an independent Macedonia, except to renounce their greediness with regard to territory which does not belong to them anyway.

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All friends of Macedonia in the European countries and in America have recommended exactly such a settlement of the Macedonian question. The famous Englishman and former prime minister, William E. Gladstone, was the first to proclaim the formula of "Macedonia for the Macedonians." The great Russian historian and statesman, former minister of foreign affairs, Professor Paul N. Miliyukoff, pointed out more than once that Macedonia must be autonomous as a step toward the Balkan federation, and that her division would lead to dissatisfaction and wars.[32] The well-known and for many years Balkan correspondent for the London *Times,* James D. Bourchier, an excellent student of the Balkan political situation, in vain recommended to President Wilson to present to the Paris Peace Conference the question for the revival of Macedonia, even if only as an American mandate for the first number of years. It is impossible for us to enumer-

32. Professor Miliyukoff, during 1899, had written in the Russian journal *Ruskoe Bogatstvo* (Russian Wealth), that in the discussion of the old project for a Balkan federation it was invariably stopped over the unsolved Macedonian question. He pointed out that Serbia's desire for the division of Macedonia could only be realized through war, and then it would be forcibly imposed upon Bulgaria and also on the majority of the Macedonian population. The desire for autonomy, according to Miliyukoff, harmonizes with diplomatic practices and traditions, as well as with the disposition of the Macedonians. During July, 1913, Miliyukoff declared in a speech delivered in the Russian Duma, that Macedonia ought to be autonomous since that would be the most natural solution of the Macedonian question. See the collection of the journal *Ruskoe Bogatstvo,* p. 291.

ate here all the names of the many foreign authorities on Macedonia. However, they would all show that the independence of Macedonia would be in complete harmony with all the great principles so often proclaimed since the first World War.

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The creation of independent Macedonia will round out the liberation of the Balkans which started at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Only after that could there be the beginning of a real rapprochement of the free Balkan peoples. Only then could they undertake mutual obligations not to resort to war as a means of national and state policy. If it would be mutually desired by all, they could—as stated before—even build a Balkan federation. Once the Macedonian question is settled, it would mean both practically and symbolically, well-settled and tranquil Balkans. And if the Balkan States cannot reconcile themselves in connection with Macedonia, which is for them a touchstone, then all other settlements would rest upon sandy foundations.

Once, five centuries ago, the Balkan states disappeared one after the other because of the absence of unity. Disunited, quarreling, fighting, and causing each other undue injustices, they could again easily disappear in the future. The cohesive element for security, peace, and unity among them could be found only in their mutual trust. It shall come when justice is brought down from the cross upon which it was crucified. The Balkan peoples must not permit that any people among them be humiliated and plundered. If the great nations feel the necessity to hold together with other forces close to them by interest, mentality, and location, still more must the small Balkan states depend upon one another, because by interest, mentality, and location they were created by nature as one bloc.

Wisdom in politics is, above all, foreseeing the future. If a new world is to be organized, the mistakes of the past must be

recognized and the necessary corrections must be made. All the sources of injustice must be eradicated because they are sources of disturbance. The several very controversial provinces in Europe, instead of being forcibly kept by others, must be permitted to become independent. A classical example of such a province in Europe is Macedonia. We reiterate that refutations that such disputed provinces cannot be self-sustaining are groundless. Until the present no one ever fed them. The people there have managed with sweat and labor to make their own living. Actually such provinces also produce enough to feed their conquerors, who have converted them into an object of exploitation.

Macedonia, should be able to have the right to rely on political help from abroad. Not a single one of the Balkan states was ever created without the assistance of some or all of the Great Powers. At the time when Serbia was fighting to free herself from the Turkish yoke, she was supported by Russia and Austria-Hungary. During her insurrection in 1821, the Greek nation hung in the balance and was saved only by the intervention of the Great Powers. The most blessed help for all the Balkans would be that which Macedonia would receive. Whatever support is given to the Macedonians would not be an undeserved gift. They have proved through their struggles that they deserve their freedom.

Today the international organizations, such as the United Nations, intervened, and finally succeeded in bringing about the creation of a separate Palestine state. The Great Powers have twice enjoined the independence of Austria. Also elsewhere in the world special regimes have been set up until a satisfactory solution was found for controversial questions. Meanwhile Macedonia has struggled for half a century in order to attain her freedom and independence. Give her that freedom and independence and then see to what extent she is a "troublesome" land! It would then become clear that others were responsible for the provocation of the disorder there.

It is clear why the Macedonians spoke earlier for autonomy. All of Macedonia was then under Turkish rule. Under an autonomous regime she could have existed as a whole within the boundaries of the Turkish state. But after 1912 only independence could be demanded. As had been the fate of Poland in several instances, Macedonia was then divided and was put under three different rules. Under such a situation Macedonia had at her disposal neither the wholeness of her territory, nor her seacoast, nor the highways necessary for her commerce. She was not even going under her own name in the three parts—one part was called "northern Greece", another, "southern Serbia" and the third, "Bulgarian Macedonia".

An international guarantee, similar to that fixed for Switzerland, is necessary for Macedonia also, because previous international agreements with respect to Macedonia were seldom observed. Turkey never did fulfill them. Neither did Greece and Serbia. Such international guarantee would have been welcomed long ago by the Macedonian Bulgarians. Thus, for example, the revolutionary congress of the Bitolia and Adrianople provinces held during May and July of 1903 (after the Salonica decision to call an insurrection in Macedonia) resolved that the Central Committee of the *IMRO,* in the name of the Macedonian population, should present before the Great Powers demands for:

1. A governor, independent from the Porte in the management of his functions.

2. The introduction of a joint and permanent international control with the widest power of sanctions.

Behold! Here is a categorical document against the chicanery and accusations that the Macedonian Committee was aiming for the annexation of the country to Bulgaria! Exactly the opposite—the Committee pleaded for Macedonia to be put under international supervision and protection. By demanding this, the

Macedonian liberation movement showed that it had under consideration for Macedonia—in the future—the gradual attainment of a guaranteed neutrality similar to that of Switzerland.

Such instances in international relations come up mainly for two reasons. The first reason is to prevent friction between certain neighboring countries. The guaranteed state serves as a buffer which would tend to eliminate quarrels between the neighbors. The existing quarrels about Macedonia are well-known. The second reason is to protect the weaker state against the danger of annexation. In this respect there is no more typical example than Macedonia. The greed and desire of her neighbors to annex her are also well known.

Since the geographic and economic conditions have created Macedonia a rounded whole, international policy should demand her resuscitation. It is required because of the series of disagreements, struggles, and wars between the Balkan peoples, and also because of the contradictions between the Great Powers. Through the attainment of that resuscitation, the whole Balkan political complexion and psychological atmosphere would be favorably changed.

The ideas stated here have been accepted by the Macedonian liberation movement for more than a half-century. They have been favorably approved by all liberal circles abroad. We deem it, therefore, that the idea for an independent Macedonia and for the Balkan pacification ought to be still more acceptable now, since so urgently discussed are the necessity of peace and unity for all of Europe.

Here we are not engaged with an abstract academic theme, but with a pressing need influencing the peace of the Balkans, Europe, and the world!

Macedonia suffers from the same disease which once plagued the cantons before the independence and neutrality of Switzer-

land was recognized. Against identical disease there should be administered a like remedy.

Macedonia must become a "Switzerland" in the Balkans!

THE END

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